[1]        
On September 1, 2022, day one of a scheduled
one-and-a-half day trial, I found 46-year-old Cameron Hardy guilty of in
facie
contempt of court,
otherwise known as contempt in
the face of the court.

[2]        
He is a disciple of “Organized
Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments” (OPCA) theory. As explained by him, he
is a freeman. He proclaims that he was created by the creative source. He
claims to be a man of mankind, being something other than a human being. Simply
put, he says that he is a man, a mankind, not some legal identity on a piece of
paper that was created by man and owned by man. Accordingly, in his mind, he is
not a person or an individual, and therefore the courts of British Columbia
hold no jurisdiction over him. He rejects the name, Cameron Hardy. Instead, he
self-identifies by various names, including “A Man Known As Cameron Hardy” and
“A Man Commonly Called Cameron Hardy.” For my decision, I will refer to him
simply as Hardy.

[3]        
Even if I am wrong about Hardy’s legal name or
his status as the defendant on the substantive matter, today, I am sentencing
the person who was standing in front of the court on September 1, 2022, who
committed contempt in the face of the court.

I.         INTRODUCTION

[4]        
The courts of British Columbia are legitimate,
or they are not. There is no middle ground. There are no shades of grey.
Unfortunately for Hardy, the courts of British Columbia, including the
Provincial Court of British Columbia, are legitimate.

[5]        
British Columbia and
Canadian laws apply to Hardy, no matter how he identifies, what words he uses to describe himself, or his political orientation. The
criminal law, and the procedures that govern its implementation, are part of
the law of British Columbia and Canada and apply to all. Opting out is not an
option.

[6]        
As a result of his refusal to recognize the
legitimacy of the court, heed court orders and directions, and participate in
the trial process, Hardy finds himself before the court for sentencing for
contempt of court.

[7]        
The superior courts and s. 9 of the Criminal
Code
recognize the authority of a Provincial Court judge to forego the formal trappings of a criminal trial
and summarily punish for in facie contempt of court.

[8]        
One leading in facie contempt of court
case is R. v. B.K.,
1995 CanLII 45 (SCC). As set out by Justice Major
(in dissent)
in B.K.,

26 I agree with
the caution expressed by Lord Denning in Balogh that the power of
summary punishment is a great but necessary one that
is
to be used with scrupulous care.

[9]        
In the present case, because of Hardy’s
behaviour and flagrant disregard for the directions and order of the court,
there existed an urgent
and imperative
need to utilize the summary contempt
procedure on day one of his substantive trial.
Specifically, Hardy’s
refusal to follow the court’s directions and order was deliberate and
premeditated, as evidenced by the written script he had in his possession and
read to the court. He undertook a calculated and intentional course of action,
as he had on previous court occasions, specifically to thwart the court from
proceeding with his trial. He maintained his behaviour despite being encouraged
to engage legal counsel and being told of his actions’ potential consequences.
His conduct was contemptuous of the court and the administration of justice.

II.         OPCA ARGUMENTS

[10]      As
stated on page 764 in Enjoy The Silence: Pseudolaw At The Supreme Court of
Canada

Because
pseudolaw has no actual validity, OPCA litigants by definition abuse court
processes when they advance these ideas. Furthermore, Canadian case law on this
subject is now highly developed. Post-Meads, an OPCA litigant is
unlikely to enter court, let alone an appeal court, unaware that the ideas he
or she intends to argue have been the target of strong court criticism.

Nevertheless,
some OPCA litigants’ belief in pseudolaw is apparently sincere…Social
scientists who have investigated these populations confirm there are true
believers in this community who are driven by a combination of conspiratorial
and political beliefs, reinforced in a kind of social echo chamber.

When
viewed exclusively from a government and court perspective, pseudolaw is
nothing but a waste of state and institutional resources. That perspective
misses something important. Pseudolaw leads to self-inflicted injury by those
who advance these toxic ideas, including increased litigation damages and
costs, criminal sanctions, psychiatric detention, foreclosed homes, and broken
families. In a very real sense, OPCA litigants are the victims of the conman
gurus who sell supposed secrets to the real but concealed law. Worse, OPCA
theories authorize unorthodox and illegal actions against government, police, and
court workers, including violence.

Pseudolaw is a form of
legal quackery or snake oil. Much as doctors and scientists are the most
effective critics of pseudomedical and pseudoscience frauds, courts are the
expert bodies logically and functionally positioned to refute OPCA
misconceptions with clear, substantive, and responsive court decisions.

[11]      Whether
Hardy is a “true believer” or simply an “opportunist” using OPCA to delay and
disrupt the court process, his reliance on the discredited OPCA theory c
learly
contributed to his contemptuous behaviour on September 1, 2022.

And even though no OPCA defence has been successful on its merits –
see R.
v. Hardy
,
2007 BCCA 523 and R. v. Hardy, 2007 BCSC 125, for examples
of how an OPCA defendant was successful on appeal because the Crown did not
prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial court stage – the courts
are still having to deal on a regular and on-going basis with civil court
litigants and criminal defendants who embrace OPCA theory. So, in light of the
zero percent chance of success on the merits in the courts, why do people still
espouse OPCA theory?

[12]     
In Overcoming Knowledge Resistance: A
Systematic Review of Experimental Studies
, the authors state:

A
well-known fact is that people surprisingly often believe in things that are
simply not true. For example, the public stance on climate change in the US has
become increasingly contentious (Leshner, 2015; van der Linden, 2015), and many
believe that vaccination has negative health effects (Larson et al., 2016).
Such unfounded beliefs predict a range of maladaptive perceptions and
behaviors, including poor health choices, climate change denial, and decreased
civic virtue (Grebe & Narrrass, 2012; Jolley & Douglas, 20l4).

An obvious question
then is why people, in this era of information abundance, hold beliefs that
contradict reason and rigorous observation. While there is little doubt that
humans are capable of rational thinking, research has made clear that we often
don’t form our beliefs by a rational weighing of evidence and data. Rather,
research shows that our perceptions, interpretations, and beliefs about the
world are strongly influenced by our previous beliefs, feelings, and personal
motives to view the world in one way rather than the other. Thus, people
selectively attend to information consistent with their interests or previous
beliefs, interpret neutral information or evidence that counter their attitudes
in a belief confirming manner, and distort or selectively remember objective
facts in a way that support their attitudes and decisions. Hence our reasoning
is often motivated by desires to view the world as we expect or want it to be
(for an overview, see Kunda, 1999). While modern people thus in principle have
access to more knowledge than ever before, our inherent mode of thinking
continues to make us susceptible to erroneous conclusions and false beliefs.
This type of motivated reasoning is an important factor behind misconceptions
that helps explain knowledge resistance.

[13]      I
may never understand the true reason Hardy has acted in the manner he has.
Nonetheless, he has relied upon OPCA theory misinformation to delay and disrupt
his court proceedings. He relied upon and spread his OPCA disinformation
intending to harm or deceive the court and the administration of justice.

[14]      As
with the defendant
in R. v. Kuleba, 2021 ONSC 1016, Hardy’s stubbornly
wrong reliance on the OPCA theory he advanced caused him to reject
opportunities provided to him by the court.

[15]      Concerning
OPCA theory, I repeat what I said in paragraph 1 of
Ruling
Re:
Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments,
in
R. v. Hardy, 2022 BCPC 189,

…I also had the
opportunity to reflect upon what has become known in Canada — and other parts
of the world, too — as pseudo-legal arguments. And one of the interesting
things about pseudo-legal arguments, regardless of whether one is of the
detaxer or freeman of the land or sovereign citizen ideology/philosophy, is
that there has not been a single case in Canada supporting this particular
theory. Judges are, by precedent, allowed to look at previous decisions of the
court and decisions of a superior court are binding on me. What that means is
that superior courts have said that I may and should summarily dismiss these
kind of arguments, and by summarily dismiss, that means not waste the
taxpayers’ money, the court’s time, your time, the prosecutor’s time, the court
clerk’s time, or anyone else’s time, with an argument that has zero chance of
success.

[16]      As
a Provincial Court judge, I am bound by precedent. I also pay heed to
persuasive case law from outside of British Columbia.
Cases such as R. v.
Trifunski
2022 BCSC 609, Parhar v. British
Columbia (Attorney General)
, 2021
BCSC 700
, R. v. Merrill2021
BCSC 1017
, R. v. August-Sjodin2020 BCSC 826, R. v. Ciciarelli,
2019 ONSC 6719, R. v. Penner2018 MBQB 200, R. v. Jacobi, 2017 BCSC 1106, R. v. Petrie, 2012
BCSC 2110
, and R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, have considered the issues
already. OPCA litigants cannot succeed when relying upon their OPCA theory as
legally sound in Canadian courts. The case law makes it clear that the
arguments and philosophies being advanced by Hardy have no legal authority and
are nonsensical. Accordingly, I refused to re-litigate OPCA claims and engage
with Hardy concerning OPCA contentions.

[17]      In
the leading case of
Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, Associate
Chief Justice
Rooke of the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench said the following about courts’ responses to OPCA cases:

[586] Canadian courts
have adopted a variety and range of responses to OPCA litigants and litigation.
Any judge who faces OPCA litigation should consider deployment of all tools in
this arsenal, and others that may be developed for this difficult litigant
category.

[18]      I
am aware of the debate over whether OPCA-type defendants and litigants are
delusional and suffering from a type of mental illness versus being
anti-government
ideologists, expressing their political philosophies in an unorthodox manner.
The temptation is to lean towards believing some OPCA-type defendants and
litigants have a form of mental illness when one observes how people like
Hardy,
confronted with the reality that their
position cannot win, still carry on with their OPCA-type contentions and
behaviour.

[19]      On
pages 1174-5 in After The Hammer: Six Years of
Meads v. Meads, Donald J.
Netolitzky, author and legal researcher, addresses the issue head-on:

The Meads OPCA
indicia serve another useful role not suggested in that decision. Psychiatric
investigation of Freemen and Sovereign Citizens has concluded adherence to
pseudolaw conspiracies is an expression of extreme political beliefs,
reinforced in small introspective social communities. However, the peculiar
formulaic expression of these ideas mimics delusion. That has resulted in
misdiagnosis of these persons as mentally ill. OPCA ideas such as the
“Strawman” duality have been misidentified as a mental health issue, rather
than pseudolaw. Court-ordered psychiatric examinations and detentions may
result. The Meads OPCA indicia are therefore a helpful resource to
distinguish between persons who litigate because of mental illness versus
anti-government ideology expressed in an unorthodox manner.

[20]      I
have not ordered a psychiatric assessment for Hardy, finding him intelligent,
albeit an anti-government ideologist. He understands the difference between
right and wrong. He has merely selected wrong over right.

[21]      Having
rejected mental health issues playing a role in Hardy’s disruptive behaviour
and reliance on OPCA theory, I next consider how misinformation has contributed
to Hardy’s contempt of court.

[22]      OPCA
theory falls into the category of misinformation, defined on page 13 in The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and
its resistance to correction
, as “any
informat
ion that turns out to be false.”
Scholarly articles such as After The Hammer: Six Years of
Meads v. Meads,
The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to
correction
and Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the
“Post-Truth” Era

provide context to the reality that individuals, despite all evidence to the
contrary, continue to rely upon misinformation, leading to poor judgement and
decision-making. It is the way for OPCA theory proponents.

[23]      It
seems that phraseology such as “post-truth” and “fake news” has
become increasingly prevalent in public discourse
. As a
court system, we need to recognize how the growing abundance of misinformation
influences people in the political, technological, and societal context,
including the courtroom. Regarding OPCA theory proponents, we need to develop a
concrete methodology to deal with them once rationale thought and societal
norms have been rejected by the OPCA theory proponent. After all, if left
unchecked, OPCA theory can and will harm the court system, as evidenced by
Hardy’s success at turning what should have been a one to two-day trial into a
costly and time-consuming exercise that has morphed into two separate files:
the substantive trial file and the contempt of court file.

[24]      In trying to understand Hardy’s rationale for his contempt of
court, I appreciate the warning given on pages 13 and 14 in The
psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction
:

The
psychology and history of misinformation cannot be fully grasped without taking
into account contemporary technology. Misinformation helped bring Roman
emperors to power, who used messages on coins as a form of mass communication,
and Nazi propaganda heavily relied on the printed press, radio and cinema.
Today, misinformation campaigns can leverage digital infrastructure that is
unparalleled in its reach. The internet reaches billions of individuals and
enables senders to tailor persuasive messages to the specific psychological
profiles of individual users. Moreover, social media users’ exposure to
information that challenges their worldviews can be limited when communication
environments foster confirmation of previous beliefs — so-called echo chambers.
Although there is some controversy about echo chambers and their impact on
people’s beliefs and behaviours, the internet is an ideal medium for the fast
spread of falsehoods at the expense of accurate information. However, the
prevalence of misinformation cannot be attributed only to technology: conventional
efforts to combat misinformation have also not been as successful as hoped —
these include educational efforts that focus on merely conveying factual
knowledge and corrective efforts that merely retract misinformation.

For
decades, science communication has relied on an information deficit model when
responding to misinformation, focusing on people’s misunderstanding of, or lack
of access to, facts. Thus, a thorough and accessible explanation of facts
should overcome the impact of misinformation. However, the information deficit
model ignores the cognitive, social and affective drivers of attitude formation
and truth judgements. For example, some individuals deny the existence of
climate change or reject vaccinations despite being aware of a scientific
consensus to the contrary. This rejection of science is not the result of mere
ignorance but is driven by factors such as conspiratorial mentality, fears,
identity expression and motivated reasoning — reasoning driven more by personal
or moral values than objective evidence. Thus, to understand the psychology of
misinformation and how it might be countered, it is essential to consider the
cognitive architecture and social context of individual decision makers.

…..

Different types of
misinformation exist — for example, misinformation that goes against scientific
consensus or misinformation that contradicts simple, objectively true facts.
Moreover, the term disinformation is often specifically used for the subset of
misinformation that is spread intentionally. More research is needed on the
extent to which different types of misinformation might be associated with
differential psychological impacts and barriers for revision, and to establish
the extent to which people infer intentionality and how this might affect their
processing of the false information.

[25]     
The observations of Justice Graesser in A.V.I.
v. M.H.V.B.
, 2020 ABQB 790, a recent case dealing
with a defendant named Robinson who espoused OPCA and Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion”
(MCLR) theory, hold in Hardy’s case:

52 
The consequences of contempt are not trivial. In Fearn v Canada Customs
2014 ABQB 114, and in
particular paragraphs 215-256, the Court concluded that gurus who promote
OPCA schemes that purportedly defeat legitimate court authority are
engaged in criminal contempt of court.

53  This
may appear to be the use of a sledgehammer to crush an ant. I would instead use
the analogy of an inoculation to stop a virus. OPCA and MCLR gurus harm
people. Ms. Robinson has already harmed MHVB and her family. These gurus teach
illusions that will predictably fail. They promise much, but their clientele
gets less than nothing.

54  These schemes are nothing more than
cons, led by people who rely and feed on the oft-quoted statement attributed to
P.T. Barnum (of circus fame): a sucker is born every minute. That is as true
now as it was when spoken more than 150 years ago. The Courts are not suckers.
And the Courts will not be intimidated.

[26]      Despite
having been ordered not to do so, Hardy’s use and reliance upon OPCA theory –
combined with his refusal to recognize the court’s legitimacy, heed court
orders and directions, and participate in the trial process – resulted in Hardy
finding himself before the court for sentencing for contempt of court.

[27]      The
procedural steps customarily required by natural justice would not have been of
any benefit in the situation faced by the court in the present case, as
evidenced by Hardy’s refusal to speak to a lawyer or have a lawyer represent
him, combined with his reliance on OPCA theory and his disruptive behaviour
before, during and after the finding of contempt, until his removal by the
sheriffs from the courtroom. With Lord Denning’s warning in mind, the court
decided that Hardy’s behaviour on September 1, 2022, demanded immediate action
from the court. The court could not allow it to continue.

III.        FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[28]      The
events leading up to, on, and after September 1, 2022, involving Hardy must be
understood to understand the bigger picture. As such, I have reviewed the DARS
recordings made during Hardy’s court appearances and the available official
court transcripts. I am setting out the relevant facts.

[29]      I pause to note that by considering how Hardy has conducted
himself before and since I found him in criminal contempt of court on September
1, 2022, I am not considering new findings of contempt. Rather, I am reflecting
on the facts solely to inform my application of the relevant sentencing factors
discussed below and the appropriate sentence to be levied.

May
15, 2021

[30]      Prince
Rupert Court Information 30766-1 was created on May 15, 2021, and it contained
a single count:

Count
1

Cameron HARDY, on or
about the 14th day of May, 2021, at or near Prince Rupert, in the Province of
British Columbia, did resist or wilfully obstruct Cst. Kanil Youngman, Cst.
Britney Doney and Cst. Chris Askey, peace officers in the execution of their
duty, contrary to Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

In connection with the matter, Hardy was
allegedly arrested on May 14, 2021, and made his first court appearance by
telephone on May 15, 2021, on an in-custody basis. The prosecutor told the
sitting Judicial Justice that the arrested individual might ascribe to the
beliefs of being a freeman of the land and that the police had attempted to
consent release the individual on an undertaking, but the individual would not
participate in the process.

[31]      As
Covid-19 preventative measures were in place, and the individual described by
the police as “Mr. Hardy” refused to wear a mask, there was some delay in
getting Hardy to a telephone for the hearing. Once on the phone, the Judicial
Justice asked Hardy if he was Cameron Hardy. Hardy replied, “I am a freeman
being prisoned for breathing freely,” followed by a monologue expressing
several OPCA-style concepts. When the Judicial Justice tried to release Hardy
on a Release Order, Hardy refused to accept any terms, started telling of his
dissatisfaction with the entire process, claimed that he was racially
discriminated against, and would not agree to the Judicial Justice’s offer of
contract. Hardy then continued with his monologue, telling the Judicial Justice
many things, including:

*           the
Judicial Justice had no authority over him;

*           you
kidnapped me;

*           you
stole from me;

*           you
abused me;

*           you
tortured me in the cell on a cold, hard, concrete floor;

*           you
assaulted me;

*           the
guy fractured my ribs;

*           he
was medically exempt from wearing a mask, and the Liquor Store staff refused to
accommodate him;

*           he
has been victimized;

*           he
has broken no law;

*           there
was no victim;

*           he
wanted his rights as a freeman;

*           the court
had no authority over him as he was a freeman.

[32]       The
prosecutor and the Judicial Justice questioned Hardy’s ability to understand
and process what was happening. At this point, the Judicial Justice, despite
initially wanting to release Hardy from custody, asked if an overnight psych
assessment of Hardy might be required. The Judicial Justice adjourned Hardy to
May 17, 2021, for an in-custody judicial interim release hearing in Northern
Virtual Bail Court before a judge.

 May
17, 2021

[33]      Hardy
was to make his second in-custody court appearance on May 17, 2021, appearing
by video in Northern Virtual Bail Court before Judge Fleck. However, Hardy
refused to leave his cell for the virtual court appearance. In his absence,
Judge Fleck remanded Hardy in custody to May 18, 2021, for a judicial interim
release hearing.

May
18, 2021

[34]      Hardy’s
third in-custody court appearance was scheduled in Northern Virtual Bail Court
on May 18, 2021. Hardy refused to put on a mask so he could be moved to the
phone room for the judicial interim release hearing. After approximately 18
minutes had elapsed, a police officer made their mobile telephone available for
Hardy’s use in his jail cell, and Hardy subsequently made his court appearance
by telephone. Judge Fleck released Hardy on a Release Order without financial
obligation, with only one condition: You must not go to or be within 10 meters
of the BC Liquor Store at 100 – 2nd Avenue West, Prince Rupert,
British Columbia. Judge Fleck then adjourned Hardy’s subsequent court appearance
to Prince Rupert on May 26, 2021.

May
26, 2021

[35]      When
Prince Rupert Court Information 30766-1 was called for a first appearance, an
individual who identified himself as “I am man commonly called Cameron Hardy”
appeared in court by telephone. I was the sitting judge. When asked if he would
have a lawyer representing him in court, he replied that he would be
representing himself. He then challenged the court’s jurisdiction. He told the
court his language of use was English, and he was not entering a plea. He
demanded that the court produce a contract with him. I entered a “not guilty”
plea on his behalf because he refused to enter a plea. The court file was
adjourned to June 23, 2021, to allow Hardy the opportunity to consult legal
counsel.

June
23, 2021

[36]      I
was the sitting judge on June 23, 2021. Hardy appeared by telephone and
introduced himself as “I am man commonly called Cameron Hardy by special
appearance.” Hardy challenged the court’s jurisdiction when asked if he had a
lawyer. Hardy referenced a document he had filed with the court on June 21,
2021, demanding that the court produce a contract between the Provincial Court
and himself that sets out various things, including a verifiable claim that he
had committed harm. The document also claimed the Provincial Court lacked
jurisdiction and demanded that the court discharge all charges and expunge the
court file.

[37]      When
asked if he had any case law from Canada to support his position, Hardy
repeated his request for a contract with a verifiable claim instead of replying
to the question. He then began a speech setting out his OPCA theories. When
specifically asked if he was Cameron Hardy, he stated, “No,” and then continued
to voice his title and various OPCA-type beliefs. However, he did say that he
was the man the police arrested and confirmed that he would not have a lawyer.
The matter was adjourned to July 7, 2021, in Prince Rupert to set the trial
date.

July
7, 2021

[38]      A
person who identified himself as “a man commonly called Cameron Hardy by a
special appearance to challenge jurisdiction” appeared by telephone in Judge
Stewart’s courtroom when Prince Rupert court information 30766-1 was called.
The individual immediately engaged in the following exchange with the court
clerk and Judge Stewart:

HARDY:
I filed a notice with the court yesterday. Did you receive that, dated July
5th?

THE
COURT: With a fingerprint on it?

THE
CLERK: Is that the one that —

HARDY:
Yeah.

THE
COURT: All right.

HARDY:
With a signature, yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.

[39]      After
Judge Stewart explained to Hardy that a trial date would be set, Hardy
immediately responded that the court’s jurisdiction was challenged. Hardy told
Judge Stewart, “I am not Mr. Hardy, just so you know. I am a man commonly
called Cameron Hardy and by special appearance challenge jurisdiction.” When
asked if he was the person appearing on the information for Mr. Hardy, Hardy
told Judge Stewart, “I’m not a — no, I’m not a person. I’m a man commonly
called Cameron Hardy. I am the one that was illegally and unlawfully arrested.”

[40]      After
much discussion and argument back and forth over the court’s ability to fix a
trial date without proving to Hardy the court had jurisdiction, Judge Stewart
had the court clerk telephone the Judicial Case Manager. The following exchange
occurred:

THE
COURT: All right, man commonly called Cameron Hardy I have now — this is Judge
Stewart. We’ve called the judicial case manager and we’re now going to fix the
date for trial based on the Crown’s estimate of one day and so you can follow
the process. The judicial case manager with the information number has the RCMP
officers that are necessary to testify and so the date can be set based on the
court’s availability first and then their availability. So, standby, man.

HARDY:
I — I object. Failure to produce a contract of verified claim
[indiscernible/teleconference] this court lacks jurisdiction and I require the
case discharged immediately.

THE
COURT: All right, man commonly called Cameron Hardy understand that I have
already ruled on that to be clear, all right? So, you’ll — if you — it’s not
— it’s not uncommon that people disagree with my decisions and there are —
there are remedies for that, but the remedy — the remedy today is not just to
restate your position, all right? You have been very clear and it’s clearly
recorded. Everything we do is recorded. So — so, your position has been made
clear. I have made a decision.

HARDY:
So [indiscernible/teleconference] burden of proof is [indiscernible] where
jurisdiction squarely counts it cannot be presumed or assumed. It must be
proven by man or woman within this court. You have proven jurisdiction. Is that
what you are saying

THE
COURT: Man, no one needs to prove my jurisdiction to fix a trial date with
respect to an information. So, everything is done in sequence.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: Sir –

HARDY:
Where jurisdiction [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Sir — sir, I’ve heard your — I don’t need to hear submissions on this
point, all right? I don’t need to hear submissions on this point.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] the law.

THE
COURT: Man — man, don’t speak over me, all right? I’m — I’m very clear on
this. Don’t speak over me. What we are doing right now is we are fixing the
date for trial. Go ahead, so –

HARDY:
And I’m objecting.

THE
COURT: I — your objection is clear. Your objection is clear, all right? We are
fixing the date. Madam JCM, the — the first available date for a one-day trial
in this matter?

JUDICIAL CASE MANAGER:
Thank you, Your Honour. Prince Rupert Criminal File 30766-1, R. v. Cameron
Hardy, the first available date for trial, in Prince Rupert, is September 3rd,
2021.

[41]      The
court appearance ended with the following exchange:

THE
COURT: Last — next — next, man. So, you are self-represented.

HARDY:
No, I don’t — I don’t represent anything.

THE
COURT: All right.

HARDY:
I represent I, man.

THE
COURT: All right. There is going — there is going to be a trial with an
accused person on –

HARDY:
Again, I’m not a person. I’m a man.

THE
COURT: Don’t interrupt me. Don’t interrupt me, Mr. Hardy. Let me finish. You
have made your position clear, all right? There are –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Don’t, stop. Don’t speak to me again until I invite you to do so. I am
absolutely clear that I have jurisdiction within the four walls of this
courtroom. It is one of the very few places. I do not have general jurisdiction
across the Province of British Columbia, but I have absolute jurisdiction within
the four walls of this courtroom. I am going to just say one last thing, which
is this. To prepare for a trial there are very good resources on our website, www.provincialcourt.bc.ca.
There are good self-help guidelines. One should come to trial prepared. Bring a
pad of paper, pen, and bring the disclosure package that has been provided to
you. Using those self-help guides prepare yourself with respect to what the
essential elements of the offence of wilful obstruction are and think through
whether or not the — the — what types of questions you may wish to ask of the
various different witnesses. If you seek to have a witness testify at the trial
there are – there is good information there in terms of the process that you
can use to compel their attendance. It is important that you do that, because
if you show up on the trial date and you had thought that someone was going to
appear and give evidence and they don’t, one issue may be whether or not the
proper process was followed. There are also books available to you in the
library. The library here is only open on Wednesday afternoons and other —
otherwise I think that that is all — all that I need to say. So –

HARDY:
Okay, well, I object. I challenge jurisdiction [indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: All right. This next appearance on this matter is September 3rd, Mr.
Salamati.

CNSL
J. SALAMATI: Thank you, Your Honour.

THE
COURT: The next appearance we are adjourned to the trial date.

CNSL
J. SALAMATI: Thank you, Your Honour.

THE COURT: Thank you,
sir. Thank you for your patience.

September
3, 2021 – Hardy’s First Scheduled Trial Date

[42]      September
3, 2021, was Hardy’s first trial date. He appeared in court by telephone,
although he stated he spent about 45 minutes waiting on MS Teams
videoconferencing, only to be kicked out. The court appearance began with the
following exchange:

THE
COURT: Thank you. Is Cameron Hardy present on the MS Teams

link?

HARDY:
They — I was on there for about 45 minutes and they kicked me off and wouldn’t
let me back in, so I dialled in on the conference number here and before
[indiscernible/teleconference] put you all on notice I am a man and I speak to
a man and womankind only. All I require is you to acknowledge that you have
been given notice of this.

THE
COURT: Okay, so there is two things. One, you need to let me know if you are
answering –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — you need to let me know if you are answering the charge against
Cameron Hardy and two, let me know what terminology you would like me to call
you. So, are you answering Court Information 30766-1, Count 1, which reads:

Cameron
Hardy, on or about the 14th day of May, 2021, at or near Prince Rupert, in the
Province of British Columbia, did resist or wilfully obstruct Cst. Kanil
Youngman, Cst. Britney Doney and Cst. Chris Askey, peace officers in the
execution of their duty, contrary to Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

So,
are you answering that charge now?

HARDY:
I am a man commonly called Cameron Hardy. By special appearance I am
challenging jurisdiction and before I begin I will put you on notice again I am
a man and I speak to a mankind only and all I require is you to acknowledge
that I have been — that I have been given notice of this — that you have been
given notice of this.

THE
COURT: I don’t have to do –

HARDY:
And I –

THE
COURT: I don’t have to do anything, sir, and I am looking at the court
information –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — I am looking at Court Information 30766-1.

HARDY:
Okay.

THE
COURT: It is properly laid from what I can tell within the Province of British
Columbia, which gives me jurisdiction as a Provincial Court judge to deal with
the matter. So, I am dealing with the matter. You can either answer the – the
charge, sir. Sorry, I apologize. You can either answer the charge by telling me
you are answering the charge as Cameron Hardy or not. It is up to you.

HARDY:
Okay. So, are you saying that you are not going to acknowledge that I am a man?

THE
COURT: I don’t know if you’re a man or not, sir. I will acknowledge you are a
human being.

HARDY:
Your bailiff has seen me down there many times. Everyone has seen me. I’m a man
a hundred percent guaranteed, but I am of mankind. Would you acknowledge that?

THE
COURT: I don’t need to acknowledge anything, sir. I am taking note that there
is a –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — human being by the name of Cameron Hardy who has been charged on
Information 30766-1. If you are not the Cameron Hardy charged on 30766-1 then
we’re done. If you are, [indiscernible/overlapping speakers].

HARDY:
I am a man commonly called Cameron Hardy. I am the one that was assaulted and
battered [indiscernible/teleconference] unlawfully detained. I am a man, but I
[indiscernible] victim. I am not a legal identity called Cameron Hardy or
mister or sir or any of that. I am a man. Flesh and blood man, mankind, and I
am asking that you acknowledge that because I don’t deal with
[indiscernible/teleconference]. I deal with man and woman.

THE
COURT: I am not going to get into a debate about human beings with you.

HARDY:
It’s not a human being. It is mankind, man and women. That’s all there really
has been and ever will be, is man and woman in this reality of Earth.

THE
COURT: Well, everybody is entitled to their opinion. In any event –

HARDY:
It’s not an opinion. It’s [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — are you — are you making an application to appear by –

HARDY:
Are you saying that mankind doesn’t live on Earth?

THE
COURT: I am not saying anything.

HARDY:
Mankind doesn’t live on Earth?

THE
COURT: All right, listen to me, please. Are you making an application to appear
by audio conference or videoconference for the trial of 30766-1, Count 1:

Cameron
Hardy, on or about the 14th day of May, 2021, at or near Prince Rupert, in the
Province of British Columbia, did resist or wilfully obstruct Cst. Kanil
Youngman, Cst. Britney Doney and Cst. Chris Askey, peace officers in the
execution of their duty, contrary to Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

It’s
a yes or no answer.

HARDY:
I don’t [indiscernible/teleconference] to any man or woman who violates my
rights as a man. I know my rights, and I will uphold my rights. Everything I do
is for honour and [indiscernible], and I will [indiscernible] man or woman who
tries to press a false claim against me. Have you received my court notice I
filed in the record on September 2nd?

THE
COURT: Are you going to answer my question? It’s a yes or no answer.

HARDY:
I am asking if you received my court notice [indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: All right, the matter has been called — the matter has been called,
30766-1. You should be in my courtroom –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — right now. If you are Cameron Hardy you should be in my courtroom
right now. If you are not, then I am taking the fact that you are

appearing
by audio, not by videoconference, but by audio, that you are wanting to make an
application to answer the charge on File 30766-1 by way of audio. Is that what
you are making an application for, sir?

HARDY:
I am a man commonly called Cameron Hardy by special appearance –

THE
COURT: All right.

HARDY:
— and [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: It’s a yes or no answer, sir.

HARDY:
— my court notice.

THE
COURT: Are you making an application to appear by audio conference?

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers]. I am asking if you received my court
notice that I filed on September 2nd, because there is a couple

lines
on there, and I would like you to read them so you know my position.

THE
COURT: I am going to make this very clear to you, sir. You are not in charge
here, I am.

HARDY:
I am not — no, I am not sir, I am a man and I bring forth my own court, my own
mankind law.

THE
COURT: All right. I am going to take your representation earlier that you are a
man commonly called Cameron Hardy as an admission for purposes of establishing
that you are the individual in Information 30766-1 for purposes of appearing
before the court. Not for purposes of identification in the trial proper, just
so you are clear on that, Mr. Schille.

CNSL
K. SCHILLE: Certainly, Your Honour.

THE
COURT: So, are you making an application –

HARDY:
I’m not —

THE
COURT: — pursuant to s. 715.23 –

HARDY:
I’m not making –

THE
COURT: — to appear by audio conference or videoconference?

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference] and that’s a title, and what is the benefit of
accepting a title, mister or sir or individual? Unless you can tell me the
benefits, I don’t accept titles. I am a man commonly called Cameron Hardy, and
I am here by special appearance to challenge your jurisdiction.

THE
COURT: Well, I have already established that the court has jurisdiction. So,
let’s move on to the next question. Are you making an application to appear –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — by audio conference or videoconference?

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: It’s a yes or no answer.

HARDY:
You didn’t establish jurisdiction. Are you forgetting
[indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: All right.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference] where jurisdiction is squarely challenged, it
cannot be presumed or assumed unless [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: I am not ruling –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] court.

[43]      I
then read s. 715.23 of the Criminal Code out loud. Mr. Schille, for the
prosecution, interjected that the Crown would seek to identify Hardy in court
as part of the trial process. Mr. Schille also stated, “The Crown’s strong
preference would be to have the man charged on this information present in the
courtroom to proceed with trial.” Hardy and I then had the following exchange:

HARDY:
I drive — I was down at the courthouse today, and I tried to go in, and they
wouldn’t let me. They refused me access to the courthouse.

THE
COURT: Why did they not let you in the courthouse?

HARDY:
They said I had to wear a mask, and I can’t wear a mask
[indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: The provincial health officer has mandated that public buildings, which
the courthouse is one, in order to enter, you need to wear a mask. What is your
medical condition –

HARDY:
Even if –

THE
COURT: — that would not allow you to wear a mask?

HARDY:
Even if I had a medical condition –

THE
COURT: Do you have a letter from a licenced physician within the Province of
British Columbia saying that you would be unable to wear a mask for the 15 to
20 seconds it would take you to walk from the entrance of the courthouse to
Courtroom 200?

HARDY: I don’t need
another man or woman’s permission to breathe. I have been breathing my entire
life on my own.

[44]      I
went on to rule that I was not satisfied that it was in the interest of justice
that the trial proceeded with Hardy appearing by telephone and denied the
application for Hardy to appear by telephone. Hardy immediately exclaimed, “I’m
not Cameron Hardy. I don’t wish to be called something. I am a man commonly
called Cameron Hardy.”

[45]      I
then entered into another back-and-forth with Hardy, trying to determine if he
wished to apply to appear for his trial by videoconferencing. While explaining
to Hardy that he needed to make an application, he interrupted me and stated,
“I don’t have to make any application. I abide by real common law, spiritual
law. I don’t have to apply for nothing.”

[46]      After
I gave Hardy the choice of attending the courthouse in person within seven
minutes or making an application to have his trial proceed by
videoconferencing, Hardy asked for twenty minutes so that he could appear by MS
Teams videoconferencing. We adjourned the court. When we recommended sometime
later, Hardy appeared by MS Teams, but without his camera turned on. The
following exchange occurred:

HARDY:
Before I begin, I will put you all on notice I am a man, and I speak to man and
womankind only. All I require is you to acknowledge that you have been given
notice of this, that I am a man and I deal with man and woman only.

THE
COURT: I’m going to repeat what I said earlier. I am not required, nor am I
going to be answering your questions or taking commands from you. An individual
has been charged on Information 30766-1 with the name Cameron Hardy. Now, if
that individual –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — wants to identify as I, man, commonly called Cameron Hardy, that’s
that person’s business. What I am –

HARDY:
I am not an individual identifying as that. I am a man commonly called that. I
am not an individual identifying by any legal identity. I am not a legal
fiction. I was created by the creative source. I’m a man, a mankind. I’m not
some legal identity on a piece of paper that was created by man and owned by
man. So, I am not an individual.

THE
COURT: So, are you applying –

HARDY:
I’m a man.

THE
COURT: Are you applying, pursuant to s. 715.23, to appear in court today for
the trial in relation to Information 30766-1?

HARDY:
I, a man commonly called Cameron Hardy, by special appearance, challenge
jurisdiction.

THE
COURT: Well, I have jurisdiction, so we have moved on. So, yes or no, are you
applying –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Okay –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — I am going to make this very –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: I am going to make this very simple. It’s a yes or no answer.

HARDY:
Jurisdiction on what proof have you given? That you have jurisdiction. What
proof have you given that you have jurisdiction?

THE
COURT: All right, it is now 11:14 –

HARDY:
As a man [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — a.m. The individual who is appearing by video with the name I, man,
commonly called Cameron Hardy, refuses to answer the court’s question.
Therefore, I do not take the position that he has applied to appear by
videoconference. Accordingly, there will a warrant issued for the arrest of
Cameron Hardy in relation to 30766-1 for non-appearance in court today. That
will be an –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –-

THE COURT: —
unendorsed warrant. Thank you.

January 5, 2022

[47]      By
coincidence, I was the judge sitting in Northern Virtual Bail Court on January
5, 2022, when Hardy appeared in custody, having been arrested on the September
3, 2021, warrant. A lawyer did not represent Hardy, as he would not engage with
the lawyer assigned to provide free legal advice and assistance to persons in
custody. The BC Prosecution Service was agreeable to Hardy’s release, albeit on
a Release Order with a $500 cash deposit and several conditions, including
reporting to the bail supervisor and not attending to the BC Liquor Store in
Prince Rupert.

[48]      When
he addressed the court, Hardy stated that he was not a person and repeated his
OPCA-type beliefs. As part of his oration, he also told the court that he would
never wear a mask, as they cause harm, and that he could not post $500 cash
bail.

[49]      I
granted bail to Hardy on a Release Order, without financial obligation, with
three conditions: he report to a bail supervisor, provide the bail supervisor
with his address and telephone number, and not go within 100 meters of the BC
Liquor Store in Prince Rupert. I also ordered that Hardy could appear virtually
in court by MS Teams for his next court appearance so that he did not have to
wear a mask. Hardy told the court that he would not agree to or sign the
Release Order. I explained that he would remain in custody until he signed the
Release Order. I set Hardy’s next court appearance for January 12, 2022, to
allow him to consult legal counsel and set a new trial date.

January 12, 2022

[50]      Judge
Stewart was the presiding judge on January 12, 2022. Although on the previous
court occasion I made an order allowing Hardy to appear by video on January 12,
2022, he elected to appear by telephone. He immediately launched into an
OPCA-type discourse, stated that he had the defendant in his hand and was
willing to surrender it to the court, and then demanded the ability to
establish “a few things for the record.” Hardy told Judge Stewart that he does
not accept “any benefits or privileges of the legal system” and was present to
“press a claim of trespass in open court before a trial by jury as is my
right.”

[51]      When
Judge Stewart inquired if a plea had been entered, the court clerk confirmed
that a “not guilty” plea had already been entered. Nonetheless, Judge Stewart
stated that he was directing a “deemed not guilty plea’ be entered and that it
was his decision, not Hardy’s. Despite being asked numerous times to be quiet
and not talk until spoken to, in speaking over Judge Stewart, Hardy stated that
he wanted the record to show that he had not entered a plea, nor would he ever
enter a plea, and that he was not present for the benefit of the legal society
and was not part of the Bar Association. Hardy stressed that he was competent
in the law to appear before the court and that he wanted to correct the
record. 

[52]      As
Judge Stewart was in the process of adjourning Hardy to January 26, 2022, to
allow Hardy to confirm on the record the new trial date that would be fixed,
Hardy interrupted Judge Stewart and stated,

And for the record, ah,
if you put a plea on my behalf, then you are Cameron Hardy here today on Your
Honour, and you will take the responsibility of the charges here today. Let it
be known only for the record. I’m not accepting a surety. I’m not accepting
that name or the plaintiff. So let it be known, only for the record, that the
man, known as, I believe your name is Dwight Stewart, that the man acting as
judge is hereby acting as Cameron Hardy. So you’re now Cameron Hardy.

[53]      Hardy’s
court appearance ended with Judge Stewart muting Hardy and having the court
clerk disconnect the telephone call so the subsequent court case could be
called.

January
26, 2022

[54]      The
matter was called in court to confirm Hardy’s new trial dates. Hardy appeared
by telephone. When asked to identify himself, Hardy told the court,

So, I’m the man known
as Cam Hardy, and I have also brought the defendant before this court known as
Cameron Hardy, and I have the birth certificate of the defendant in my hand and
– and as I said on January 12th, I did surrender the defendant to the court.

When the Justice of the Peace asked him if
she could call him Mr. Hardy, he replied, “No. I am a man known as Cam Hardy.
The defendant in this matter is Cameron Hardy.”

[55]      After
the Justice of the Peace confirmed the trial dates with him, Hardy delivered a
monologue embracing OPCA-type ideologies and concepts, including stating that
he does not consent to the March 14 and 15, 2022, trial dates that were set:

HARDY:
Yeah, I didn’t — I didn’t consent to that. I do not consent to any legal
contract. It is not my intent to use the benefits of the legal society
[indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: Okay.

HARDY:
That said, I have committed no wrongs before the court, but if there is a
wrong, if a man or woman is making a claim I did wrong, I am more than happy to
hear any claim before this court; however –

THE
COURT: Thank you.

HARDY:
— I am also here as a man, and the reason I am here as a man is because I
believe wrongs of trespass have been done against I, man, and I wish to press a
claim before this court for what I believe to be trespass by way of unlawful
confinement and extortion.

THE COURT: Thank you,
Cam Hardy.

[56]      The
court appearance concluded with Hardy telling the court, “I will be present to
press a claim before a trial by jury on that date.”

March
14, 2022 – Hardy’s Second Scheduled Trial Date

[57]      Regional
Administrative Judge Struyk was the assigned trial judge on March 14, 2022.
Although he had not received an order from the court beforehand, Hardy appeared
by telephone, not in person, for his trial. There was less than an optimum
telephone connection.

[58]      The
proceeding began with RAJ Struyk asking Hardy if he had a lawyer, to which
Hardy replied it was not his intention to use the services of legal society.
Hardy then told RAJ Struyk he was “a man known as Cameron Hardy to press a
claim.”

[59]      Due
to the court’s continuing difficulties understanding what Hardy was saying
owing to the poor telephone connection, RAJ Struyk asked Hardy to disconnect
and call back. Hardy did so.

[60]      Once
Hardy was reconnected with the court by telephone, RAJ Struyk asked Hardy if he
was representing himself. Hardy replied, “I’m not representing anything. I’m a
man known as Cameron Hardy, and I am present to press a claim before this court
for a trial by jury. It’s not my intent to use the benefits of the legal
society here today.” When the Crown referenced Hardy as being “Mr. Hardy,”
Hardy interjected, “If they could please not refer to me as Mr. Hardy. I am not
accepting any titles. So, he can refer to me as man.”

[61]      After
the prosecutor explained to RAJ Struyk what the trial concerned, RAJ Struyk
engaged in the following conversation with Hardy:

THE
COURT: Okay. All right, Mr. Hardy, it’s your turn. Why –

HARDY:
So —

THE
COURT: Go ahead, but if I can’t understand you, sir, this proceeding will come
to an end very quickly, and I will end up having to issue a warrant for your
arrest.

HARDY:
Well, I have been calling on another phone, and I was down there today, and
they wouldn’t let me in the courthouse, and I believe that is a violation of my
right as a —

THE
COURT: Well, you can — sir — sir, you can –

HARDY:
— [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] all the matters presented.

THE
COURT: Sir — sir — sir, there is no violation of your rights. There is a
policy here in place. All courthouses are still adhering to health protocols
with respect to masks. Was that what the issue was?

HARDY:
I believe that all matters [indiscernible/teleconference] mankind have the —
have the right to be heard before a trial by jury [indiscernible].

THE
COURT: Well, this is –

HARDY:
That I have the right [indiscernible/teleconference], but I was denied.

THE
COURT: Yes, you do have a right to –

HARDY:
And also [indiscernible/teleconference], just so I am clear, if you can’t hear
me, I can call in on another phone, or I can come down there.

THE
COURT: Well –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: — I suggest — I suggest, sir, look, I am not holding this trial
outside. Are you going to wear a mask or not wear a mask if you come to the
courthouse?

HARDY:
I cannot wear a mask. That — if you –

THE
COURT: Why?

HARDY:
— are saying –

THE
COURT: Why?

HARDY:
— I have to wear a mask –

THE
COURT: Why? Why?

HARDY:
— [indiscernible/teleconference] –

THE
COURT: Why? Why?

HARDY:
— for a trial by jury.

THE
COURT: Stay on topic.

HARDY:
Because it causes harm.

THE
COURT: To who?

HARDY:
Because they cause harm.

THE
COURT: Okay.

HARDY:
I can list it in different ways that masks cause harm.

THE
COURT: And sir –

HARDY:
I have never worn a mask, and I cannot wear a mask, but I still have the right
to have my claim heard before a trial by jury.

THE
COURT: You don’t have a –

HARDY:
And they can decide if I should wear a mask or not.

THE
COURT: Sir, there is no jury trial here.

HARDY:
Well, I — I required a jury trial, trial by jury last time we spoke on
videoconference. I said I’m here as a man known as Cameron Hardy to press a
claim before the court.

THE
COURT: Well, the only person –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] my right.

THE
COURT: The only person I am dealing with is Cameron Hardy. I am not dealing
with any man in general. I am dealing with Cameron Hardy. If he doesn’t come
here to deal with his matter or give me a legitimate reason why he is not here,
I will issue a warrant for him.

HARDY:
Well, I understand, Your Honour. I do believe [indiscernible/teleconference] is
a violation of my rights as a man. So, I am here to press a claim.

THE
COURT: I don’t know –

HARDY:
And [indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: I don’t know what you’re talking about.

HARDY:
— as the defendant.

THE
COURT: I have no idea what –

HARDY:
So, I have the defendant — I have the defendant, Cameron Hardy, in — in my
hand, and I have the birth certificate that is the defendant in my hand, and I
surrender the defendant to the court at this time, and I can deliver to you
however [indiscernible/teleconference]. And that said, I do not consent to any
legal contract. It is not my intent to use the benefits of the legal society. I
am a man known as Cameron Hardy, and I believe I have committed no wrong here
before this court, but if there is a wrong, if a man or a woman is making a
claim I did a wrong I am more than happy to hear them coming before this court.
[Indiscernible] I am also here as a man and [indiscernible] as a man is to
press a claim, trial by jury, that I believe wrong has been done against I.

THE
COURT: I don’t know what you’re talking about, but what I do know is I am going
to ask the Crown to proceed against Cameron Hardy on an ex parte basis
if he does not give me a reason why he is not here in short order that is
legitimate enough for me to grant an adjournment or to — and if not, I will
simply run a trial in his absence if the Crown is willing to do that. And your
talk about jury is absolute – is this — is this matter proceeding indictably?

CNSL
J. EWASIUK: No, Your Honour.

THE
COURT: There is no right to a jury. So, don’t — don’t even say the word jury
again in this proceeding because it gets you absolutely nowhere. So, either —
I am going to give –

HARDY:
I — I am a man that has the right to press a claim before a trial by a jury of
a wrong done to I that I consider a trespass. Are you denying me the right to a
trial by jury?

THE
COURT: Yes, I am.

HARDY:
And you want to testify to that? Like, do you own this court building? Because
I believe that it’s a public court building where all matters contentious can
be settled before me and mankind. [Indiscernible/teleconference] to stop me
from bringing forth my claim. I require you to perform your duties
[indiscernible].

THE
COURT: Okay, bring a claim then.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Bring a — bring a –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Mr. Hardy — Mr. Hardy — Mr. Hardy –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers] –

THE
COURT: Oh, brother.

HARDY:
I have already stated that I have presented the person, Cameron Hardy, the
birth certificate, to this court.

THE
COURT: Okay.

HARDY:
I am also here as a man to press a claim, which is my right.

THE
COURT: Yeah, go –

HARDY:
For a trial by jury.

THE
COURT: Mr. Hardy — Mr. Hardy, if you want to start a civil suit and ask for a
civil jury go right ahead. Go right ahead and make your claim. That’s not what
this process or setting is about. So, I am going to stand this down for 15
minutes. We will get back on. If Cameron Hardy is not here personally in a mask
in the courtroom, I intend on either issuing a warrant for his arrest or
proceeding ex parte. I will give the Crown a chance to consider their
options. Fifteen minutes stand down.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference] –

THE COURT: Turn that
off.

[62]      When
court recommenced, Hardy was immediately back at it, stating over the
telephone,

I am a man known as
Cameron Hardy, and I am here as a man to press a claim before this court for a
trial by a jury. Have you received my claim filed with the court?

[63]      After
some back and forth – including input from the prosecutor and with Hardy muted
by the court due to his continual interruptions of the court – the discussion
shifted to masks and the current policy of the Provincial Court regarding the
requirement for masks in courthouses. When RAJ Struyk unmuted Hardy so that
Hardy could participate in the mask policy discussion geared towards finding a
workaround that would allow Hardy to attend the trial and not have to wear a
mask in the courtroom, the following exchange took place:

THE
COURT: Thank you. Mr. Hardy, can you speak to me about the policy that I just
read to you and that there is a way through this?

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference] I am a man [indiscernible], and I am here to
[indiscernible] before this court before a trial by jury, as stated on the last
call. Have you received my claim that I filed with the court?

THE
COURT: No. Are you going to attend for your trial, or am I going to see if I’m
— see if the court proceeds without you present? That will be your choice,
sir.

HARDY:
The defendant, Cameron Hardy, is here. I have the birth certificate in my hand
that is the defendant, Your Honour. A man known as Cameron Hardy is here as
well to press a claim. What part of that don’t you understand? I can help
clarify it for you.

THE
COURT: You are not clarifying anything for me, Mr. Hardy. You are just — you
are just playing games with the court. So, either you –

HARDY:
No, I am –

THE
COURT: Yes, you are.

HARDY:
— pressing a claim.

THE
COURT: No, Mr. Hardy.

HARDY:
It is not a game.

THE
COURT: You’re –

HARDY:
This is my life. I do not take this lightly. It’s not some game. I have been
wronged by fellow men and women acting as police officers using [indiscernible/teleconference]
rather than statutes to commit a wrong [indiscernible], and I have the right to
be heard before a trial by a jury. Are you denying me that right?

THE
COURT: Yes, we already talked about that. I am denying your right to a jury.

HARDY:
And who is making this claim? What’s your name?

THE
COURT: I already told you my name.

HARDY:
What is it?

THE
COURT: I already told you. Go look. I already told you. I am not going back
getting – you don’t ask –

HARDY:
Well, we had a bad connection. I didn’t hear. Will you please state it for the
record so I know who I am speaking with?

THE
COURT: I already said it, sir.

HARDY:
You know my name.

THE
COURT: You don’t ask questions here.

HARDY:
Well –

COURT:
You can make submissions.

HARDY:
No, I ask questions, and I — I give statements. I am not asking permission for
nothing. I am not here to accept any benefits of the legal society here today.
I am here as a man to press a claim for a trial by jury, as is my right.

THE
COURT: No, it’s –

HARDY:
Are you denying me of that right?

THE
COURT: Yes.

HARDY:
So, I consider that a trespass.

THE
COURT: Okay.

HARDY:
And I will press a claim against you, a man, so that you can testify under oath
before a trial by a jury how you think you have got the right to deny men and
women the right to a trial by a jury. I believe this is a public court building
where all matters contentious can be settled before
[indiscernible/teleconference] mankind. Who do you believe you are to stop me
from bringing forth my claim? I require you to perform your duties or else
recuse yourself now. Unless it is your intent to
[indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: So, we are getting to the place now where I am going to decide, are you
— we can proceed ex parte. I am not allowing this individual, who is
appearing by phone, to interrupt a trial any further, a trial proceeding. What
I am going to have to consider is whether or not it is appropriate to proceed ex
parte
and at the conclusion — I suppose at the conclusion of that, we will
deal with other issues, but I will simply say this. I will give Cameron Hardy a
chance to attend court yet under the terms that I have outlined and — and if
he does not attend to defend himself, then the person who is appearing by video
— or not by video even, by — Mr. Hardy, just be quiet. I am — I know this is
Mr. Hardy appearing, or it’s his agent of some form speaking a bunch of
gobbledygook.

HARDY:
No.

THE COURT: So, I will
then be prepared to issue — well, we will have to deal with a warrant, I
suppose, at some point, and it may be at the conclusion of the Crown’s case, I
think if I’m not — if I’m not mistaken.

[64]      RAJ
Struyk moved matters along by once again muting Hardy and inviting the
prosecutor to make an application to proceed with the trial on an ex parte
basis under s. 803(2)(a) of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor made his
application. RAJ Struyk then had Hardy unmuted and asked Hardy for his response
to the prosecution’s application. The following exchange took place:

HARDY:
I am appearing here today as a man known as Cameron Hardy to press a claim
before the court for a trial by jury, and I understand under the Canadian
adjudicator act [indiscernible/teleconference] multiple jurisdictions
[indiscernible]. So, if all the men and women who are involved in this legal
complaint are the same men and women that are involved in my claim, for the
convenience for the court, I am happy to press this claim by trial by jury
before the court the same time they press their complaint.

THE
COURT: That doesn’t work that way. I don’t have that kind of jurisdiction.

HARDY:
Well, I understand that you do [indiscernible/teleconference] multiple
jurisdictions. So, why would I want to waste your time with another court? I am
sure you are more than competent to handle this matter, are you not?

THE
COURT: You don’t under –

HARDY:
You cannot appear in multiple jurisdictions [indiscernible/teleconference]?

THE
COURT: First of all, you don’t ask me the questions on things like that because
I have already told you I don’t have jurisdiction to do a jury trial.

HARDY:
It’s a trial by a jury, not a jury trial.

THE
COURT: Oh, thank you for that clarification, sir. It just tells me you don’t
really know what you’re talking about, and you are being obstreperous. So, do
you want to come here?

HARDY:
No, it says I know exactly what I’m talking about. A trial by a jury is what I
require, not a jury trial. I require a trial by a jury, as is my right as a man
to press a claim before this court.

THE
COURT: I don’t know whose script you are reading, sir, but you are way off.

HARDY:
That is — that is the law. That is the law.

THE
COURT: Anyway, look, why don’t you deal with the question that is put before
you? The Crown wants to proceed in your absence bringing in the witnesses to
present their case against you, and you won’t be here if I allow that because
of the way you are dealing with this, and I am going to say once more if you
were to come to the courthouse to deal with this trial and put on a mask as I
have to — I am — everybody has to comply with this, but if you come to the
courtroom I can excuse you from wearing a mask unless there is a good reason
why I shouldn’t excuse you and then we could proceed in person here with the
trial, but if you don’t want to do that then, unfortunately, this trial — all
of the evidence may be presented in your absence and I would rather that didn’t
happen, but you’re not leaving the court a lot of — a lot of room.

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference] mankind [indiscernible] jury is the law. Now, if
the jury decides that this mask mandate and this kind of nonsense which is
utterly stupid [indiscernible] understand that [indiscernible] they could get
rid of that kind of nonsense by way of [indiscernible] statute [indiscernible]
like in this case with I, a man commonly known as Cameron Hardy.

THE
COURT: So, are you going to —

HARDY:
Do you understand? Does that make sense?

THE
COURT: No, not at all.

HARDY:
What part don’t you understand?

THE
COURT: So, you are not addressing the question. Are you going to come down here
and get to this courtroom to defend yourself or not?

HARDY:I
am not defending anything here. I am here to press a claim as a man as my right
for a trial by a jury. Now, if you’re acting a judge, you should know the law,
and you should know what a trial by jury is, and if you don’t then you should
recuse yourself immediately before you commit a trespass on my case, man.

THE
COURT: Well, it is unfortunate, Mr. Hardy, that you choose to use this kind of
language here because it is not advancing your case at all. It is not the right
jurisdiction. The court has no power to do jury trials or trials by jury, and I
simply am asking you a question. If you don’t come down here, and I am trying
to make accommodations for you so you can appear in the courtroom and defend
yourself, but you are choosing not to. Instead, you are relying on a bunch of
this fictitious law that has absolutely no traction in Canadian courts, and you
are the one that is going to lose out at least on an evidentiary basis because
you won’t be here to challenge the evidence, but that’s up to you.

HARDY:
I was there as a man to press a claim. You guys want to mask me, and they cause
some harm. That is what this whole thing is about. You don’t get to decide if I
wear a mask or not. Who are you? A trial by jury will decide if I wear a mask
or not, not you. You are not the law. It’s a public building to hear all
matters contentious to be held before me and mankind. Who do you believe you
are?

THE
COURT: Well, the only –

THE
CLERK: Oh, sorry.

THE
COURT: Yeah, go ahead. Sorry, did we lose him?

THE
CLERK: We lost that, but we didn’t lose — sorry — sorry, Mr. Hardy, are you
still there? Mr. Hardy? Mr. Hardy, can you hear me? Mr. Hardy, can you hear me?

HARDY:
I can hear you.

THE
COURT: Okay, sorry, we just lost you for a minute there.

HARDY:
I’m a man.

THE
COURT: So, yes, I think we have got you back now, Mr. Hardy.

HARDY:
Did you hear what I said?

THE
COURT: Probably, but not all of it. It’s the same —

HARDY:
Well, okay, then I will just repeat it.

THE
COURT: Well, you have said it many times already.

HARDY:
What I said is I am [indiscernible/teleconference]. What I said was that it’s a
public court building where all matters contentious can be settled before me
and mankind. Who do you believe you are to stop me from bringing forth my
claim? I require you to perform your duty as a public servant or else recuse
yourself now unless it is your intent to trespass on this case. I am a man
known as Cameron Hardy. I appear to press a claim before this court for a trial
by a jury.

THE
COURT: Mr. –

HARDY:
The defendant known as Cameron Hardy is also here. I have the birth certificate
in my hand that is the defendant, Your Honour, and man known as Cameron Hardy
is also here to press a claim. What part don’t you understand? It is pretty
simple. It’s a simple claim I wish to press. Have you never dealt with a claim
before?

THE
COURT: I am not dignifying that with a response.

HARDY:
This isn’t a complaint. I am not part — not part of the legal society. I am
not here to contract legal society. I am here as a man. A man trying to press a
claim. You don’t understand the law, the difference between a complaint and a
claim? They can have their side of the court and press their complaint while my
side of the court press my claim at the same time. There is no reason in
wasting court time if all the same men and women are here present.

THE
COURT: All right, so –

HARDY:
I also said under the adjudicator act that you can hear multiple jurisdictions
before you at one time. So, if you are not competent or you don’t know the law
on that, you can hold – or hear multiple jurisdictions, then again, I think you
should recuse yourself before you commit a trespass on my claim.

THE
COURT: So, here is the challenge that I – there is a few challenges here, and
one of them is – I mean, the obvious one to me is it seems to me that Mr. Hardy
is using the mask mandate to avoid attending into the actual courthouse,
despite the court –

HARDY:
No, I am there as a man ready to — and I entered the courthouse. They told me
I had to leave. So, unless you guys let me in, I can’t get in.

THE
COURT: But that’s because you –

HARDY:
They are denying me my right, which is against the law. It’s a public
courthouse. I have a right to be heard.

THE
COURT: Okay.

HARDY:
You guys are denying me that right, which is a crime.

THE
COURT: Yes, Mr. Hardy, thank you. We are going to mute you again.

THE CLERK: Muted.

[65]       Based
upon what seemed like an impossible situation, and in trying to determine the
best course of action forward, RAJ Struyk stated:

All
right. As I understand it, Mr. Hardy has attended at the courthouse but refused
to comply with wearing a mask to come into the courthouse. I have tried to
accommodate that by indicating I would be willing to consider him simply
removing it once he gets to the courtroom, but it is impossible to talk to him
about this as an option.

What
I am trying to think about is, is it more worthwhile to have this trial run
when there is no more a mask mandate and we have him here, balanced against all
of the challenges that an ex parte trial is going to bring to this
process, because then we are going to have a whole bunch of evidence, plus a
risk of conviction without Mr. Hardy having the opportunity to cross-examine.

I
find myself a little bit concerned about that, not because I think any of his
objections are legitimate, I just don’t, but he may cause more entanglement if
— by proceeding — may cause — there is even a possibility from what I
understand from an ex parte — I mean we are talking here ultimately
even though Mr. Hardy refers to it as his life on the line, I can’t imagine
that there is any risk of a serious sentence here if he is convicted. I see
both prosecutors shaking their heads. So, that seems to me that any sentence
that is imposed should he be convicted is at the lower end, but I find that I
don’t — I find the language and the actions taken by Mr. Hardy are completely
obstreperous. It’s just done to frustrate the court process, and he — what he is
talking about has absolute — even if it is boiled down to what it actually
were to mean mechanically or procedurally, it’s impossible to do what he says
he wants done. That is not how jurisdictions and the court work, and he seems
to be reading off a script over and over again and doesn’t actually engage in
the arguments or discussions that are put before him. Balanced against that, I
have concerns that I am creating more cost to the Canadian public by adjourning
a trial that has been set, witnesses are here, but I am worried ultimately that
what that is going to lead to is if I proceed ex parte is that
transcripts are going to be ordered. If there is a video, it is almost
impossible — you can’t capture the video on transcripts, and then if the mask
mandate is dropped, Mr. Hardy would be allowed to – would attend personally.

I
have no comment on the mask mandate itself. It is what it is. It does have
flexibility built into it which Mr. Hardy simply does not seem to want to avail
himself of. So, I can also say it is not that I don’t have other litigation
matters that I am supposed to deal with today. It’s not — and that does not —
that does not make a difference to me here, but it’s not like I will be
standing down with nothing to do. I understand there is a virtual bail court
that requires a judge, or it did anyway, and I would be the one attending for
that.

So,
I am just — I am also an out-of-town judge, which means it is going to create
more difficulties in the future if this matter proceeds ex parte. I — I
find myself very stretched here as to — as to what is the appropriate — I
think the Crown is fully within its rights to ask for an ex parte trial
and in normal — in a normal circumstance, I would probably grant it without
hesitation, but — and I — again, I want to make it perfectly clear I don’t
find any of Mr. Hardy’s arguments compelling on any grounds whatsoever, but an ex
parte
trial brings its own challenges and . . . can — can I hear anything
else from the Crown? Any other submissions? You have heard my thoughts on this.
I am not receiving really any assistance from Mr. Hardy.

CNSL
J. EWASIUK: If it — if it allayed Your Honour’s concerns, Crown could probably
proceed without the video. We could rely just on the testimony of the
witnesses, which maybe mechanically removes some of the issue.

CNSL
K. SCHILLE: As a second point, I think there is clear authority, just factoring
in the cost of a potential trial. Certainly, I think in the circumstances,
Crown has established at least a baseline case to proceed ex parte.
There is, of course, the issue of the pseudo legal arguments that are being
brought and certainly, the Meads and
Meads decision has made clear that
those don’t have to be given a lot of thrift by the court. So, there is
efficiencies on both sides potentially in trying to deal with this matter
today, but the Crown has no — Crown takes no serious position on whether an ex
parte
trial is more important than the issuance of an unendorsed warrant on
this date.

THE
COURT: All right, I am going to unmute Mr. Hardy one more time and see if he
has got anything to add or say of value and if not, I will mute him again. Go
ahead, Mr. Hardy. You have heard my thoughts on this up to now. What would you
like to say, if anything?

HARDY:
I am a man [indiscernible/teleconference], so you cannot refer to me as Mr.
Hardy or any other titles. I am not taking any titles here today. You can refer
to me as [indiscernible]. I am here as a man to press a claim for a trial by a
jury. That is my right, and I am ready to go. You guys can hold your trial on
your side of the court, and I’ll press my claim for your complaint, and I will
press my claim on my side of the court for a trial by a jury, as is the law.

THE
COURT: Are you coming down here then to deal –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/overlapping speakers].

THE
COURT: Are you coming here to deal with it?

HARDY:
Yeah, I can come down there as a man, but you do not have the right to make me
wear a mask. I cannot wear a mask. They cause me harm. We will let a jury, a
trial by jury, decide if I wear a mask or not, not you. Who do you think you
are to tell me I have to wear a mask? You have no right.

THE
COURT: One more time, Mr. Hardy, I will tell you that you can attend at the
courthouse, walk through the hallway with a mask on. You come into my
courtroom. I will excuse you from wearing a mask unless there is –

HARDY:
I do not need to — excuse me. I do not have to wear a mask. That is what this
whole case is about. I will not wear a mask when they cause me harm. Are you saying
you want me to wear a mask that causes me harm? Is that what you are stating
for the record?

THE
COURT: So, you have a medical –

HARDY:
[Indiscernible/teleconference].

THE
COURT: Yes, very good. So, you have a medical opinion that prevents — that says
you shouldn’t have to wear a mask?

HARDY:
I don’t need a medical opinion. I can tell you about 15 different reasons, ways
that masks cause harm. I am not going to cause myself harm. We will let a trial
by jury decide if I need to be masked like a good little obedient slave. We all
know this COVID is a — is a hoax. It’s a bunch of lies, and the truth is
coming out, and people are dying for COVID shots, and they’re being caused harm
by these masks. It’s common knowledge, and I require a trial by a jury so they
can decide if I wear a mask or not, not you.

THE
COURT: So, you are not actually Cameron Hardy?

HARDY: I am a man known
as Cameron Hardy here today. I also have the defendant Cameron Hardy here
today, birth certificate in my hand that is the defendant, Your Honour, and I
did surrender this to the court and I [indiscernible/teleconference] Cameron
Hardy is here to press a claim, and I can deliver the birth certificate
[indiscernible] however you want Cameron Hardy. I can bring him down to the
court right now, giving you the birth certificate because that is the
defendant. That is the [indiscernible] person, Cameron Hardy.

[66]     
As matters drew towards a conclusion, Hardy
continued with his speech making, as set out in the following exchange:

HARDY:
I am not here for Provincial Court. I am here for a trial by jury at open
court.

THE
COURT: Okay, stop.

HARDY:
I am not here to participate in your legal courts or legal complaint. You guys
can press your claim on your side of the court. I will press my claim on my
side, as is my right. [Indiscernible/teleconference] you have multi — you can
have multiple jurisdictions before you at one time.

THE
COURT: Unfortunately –

HARDY:
So, if all of the men and women that are involved in this legal complaint are
the same ones involved in my claim, for the convenience of the court, I am
happy to press this claim by trial by jury. Otherwise, I will press my claim at
civil court, and I will see you all in court before a trial by jury that way.

THE
COURT: Okay, thank you. Mute him.

THE CLERK: Muting him.

[67]      Ultimately,
when balancing Hardy’s right to a fair trial and the need to see the matter
proceed, RAJ Struyk came to the following conclusion:

So,
what I am going to do is I am going to adjourn this to the trial coordinator to
fix a new date. My objective is to set this at a time that will hopefully be
outside of this mask mandate, okay? Because I think that is being used
obviously by Mr. Hardy to his advantage.

So,
let’s set this for — I get no useful assistance from Mr. Hardy whatsoever. So,
I am going to adjourn this to a day suggested by the Crown to fix a date. I am
hoping — I have no idea when this is going to be lifted, but I think it is
going to be — I mean, I am hoping it is going to be soon. I mean, it is being
lifted in society at large, so — so, what I am going to do is put this over
for one week. Is that acceptable? With the trial coordinator, and then set a
new date for trial, and my expectation is the mask mandate will be lifted by
that point and then everything can be dealt with at the same time.

Now,
I am going to direct that the warrant be held to that fix date, okay? So, seven
days from now.

I
would accept this individual’s assistance on the Teams link, but he has been of
absolutely no assistance up to now. So, it will be at 1:30 on March the 21st.
He can appear by telephone at that fix date, and if he is difficult, then the
Crown — if he starts using all this language with the JCM, my view is you set
the trial date over his whatever he talks about. You set your Provincial Court
trial. Set it for a day and a half, and my hope is that that is set at a time
that the mask mandate is lifted so the court can have him here in person to
deal with the trial matters.

I apologize for the
inconvenience that this man has been allowed to cause the court, the witnesses,
and so forth and if it was not for this mask issue, we would be proceeding, but
I am just worried I am setting everyone up for a more complicated future if we
proceed ex parte and so that’s my direction and order, okay?

[68]      Hardy’s
case was adjourned to March 21, 2022, to fix a new trial date.

March
21, 2022

[69]      The
March 21, 2022, court date was adjourned to April 27, 2022.

April
27, 2022

[70]      On
April 27, 2022, Hardy appeared in court by telephone. He introduced himself to
the Justice of the Peace as “I’m a man known as Cameron Hardy.” The Justice of
the Peace set the trial for two days, September 1 and 2, 2022. During the fix
date, Hardy demanded four days of trial time, including two days for him to
prep his claim by jury.

September
1, 2022 – Hardy’s Third Scheduled Trial Date

[71]      On
day one of Hardy’s scheduled one-and-a-half-day trial, Hardy presented the
court with many pseudo-legal arguments
.

[72]      The
day before the start of the trial, Hardy attempted to file several OPCA-type
documents in the Prince Rupert court registry. Court registry staff brought the
documents to my attention because I was the assigned trial judge. I reviewed
the papers and then declined to have them filed in the court registry.

[73]      At
the beginning of the trial, after the prosecutor had introduced himself, Hardy
stated, “I’m the man known as Cameron Hardy. I’m here to press a claim
before this court for a trial by jury. Do you have a copy of my claim I filed
with the court?” I immediately asked Hardy, “What would you like me
to refer to you as? Man known as Cameron Hardy?” Hardy replied, “A
man known as Cameron Hardy is fine.”

[74]      Seeing
that Hardy was alone at the counsel’s table, I asked, “And you’re
representing yourself?” To which Hardy replied, “I’m not representing
anything. I’m here to present my claim. I present I, a man. I’m not
representing any legal, fictions or titles, persons.”

[75]      After
I confirmed with the prosecutor that he was satisfied that the defendant was in
the courtroom, Hardy launched into the following speech,

I am not the defendant.
I have the defendant here before this court, known as Cameron Hardy. I have the
birth certificate that is the defendant in my hand. And I’ve surrendered it to
the court. Bailiff, you can take this. That is the defendant, Your Honour,
birth certificate, and I, a man, am here to press a claim before this court, so
while they wish to press their complaint, I’ll press my claim, and I require to
do so before a trial by jury.

[76]      I
accepted Hardy’s speech as an admission that he was the defendant named in the
court Information. In doing so, I noted that Hardy initially had his birth
certificate in his hand, which he then tossed over the plexiglass barrier that
separates the court clerk from the counsel’s table. The totality of the
circumstances left no other plausible explanation. The man standing before the
court was the defendant named in Prince Rupert court file 30766-1, regardless
of what title he claimed. When the prosecutor called the case, Hardy came
forward. He identified himself as “a man known as Cameron Hardy.” He tossed his
birth certificate over the plexiglass. There was no doubt in my mind that he
was the defendant.

[77]      I
confirmed with the prosecutor that the BC Prosecution Service was proceeding by
summary conviction, after which I explained to Hardy that he had no right to a
jury trial. Hardy insisted that he wanted and was entitled to a trial by jury.
I clarified for Hardy that a jury trial was not available in law.

[78]      I
made Ruling Re:
Organized Pseudo-legal
Commercial Arguments
, summarily disallowing the
filing of OPCA-type documents
or any pseudo-legal
arguments in the trial. I clarified that superior courts have said I could and
should
summarily dismiss pseudo-legal arguments. I
explained that pseudo-legal arguments waste taxpayers’ money, the court’s time,
Hardy’s time, the prosecutor’s time, the court clerk’s time and my time with an
argument with zero chance of success.
My ruling made no
difference to Hardy.

[79]      Immediately
upon my completing the ruling, Hardy launched into the following speech:

I do understand that,
Your Honour, but I do believe — or I comprehend what you’re saying, but I do
believe this complaint is in violation of my rights as a man, so I’m here to
press a claim on my side of the court, while they go ahead and press their
complaint and I’d like to do so by trial by jury. Now, that said, I do not
consent to any legal contract, and it’s not my intent to use the benefits of
the legal society here today as I’m not part of the bar association. I’m not
the defendant. I am the man known as Cameron Hardy. I’ve surrendered the birth
certificate to the courts already. I am the man known as Cameron Hardy, and I
believe I’ve committed no wrongs here before this court, but if there is a
wrong, if a man or woman is making a claim I did a wrong, I’m more than happy
to hear any claim before this court. However, that said, Your Honour, I’m also
here as man and the reason I’m here as a man is to press a claim trial by jury
because I believe wrongs of trespass have been done against I, a man, which
include unlawful confinement and extortion by the man Kanil Youngman who acts
as police officer, unlawful confinement by the man Christopher Askey who acts
as police officer, unlawful confinement by the woman Britney Doney who acts as
police officer, and bear true by the man Kyle Schille who acts as prosecutor.
And I’ve noticed them of this claim in violation of my rights, and they have
not provided me remedy for their wrongs, so I’m here to present facts and
evidence to support said claim of said wrongs and/or trespassed against I, your
fellow man.

[80]      From
the outset, it was apparent that Hardy had no intention of complying with the
court’s orders, directions or procedures.
To try
and appease Hardy, I called him by his preferred titles, “A man known as
Cameron” and “The man known as Cameron Hardy.” It made no
difference to Hardy.

[81]      I
gave Hardy firm notice that the court would not tolerate his behaviour.
Hardy
refused to acknowledge or accept
the court’s authority and its
process’s integrity. Hardy seemed more interested in doing what he could to
stop the trial from proceeding and putting on a show for his numerous
acquaintances in the courtroom gallery.

[82]      I
concluded that Hardy’s actions and words were deliberate and malicious,
designed on his part to delay the trial and harm the proper administration of
justice and the judicial process. Accordingly, after I warned Hardy of a
possible citation for contempt of court, Hardy declared,

I’m not going to be at
the mercy of one legal entity of the same organization as this legal entity
next to me known as the prosecutor, and you’re all part of the same club. This
is not an impartial tribunal here before this court. I require a trial by jury,
as is my right.

[83]      I
immediately warned Hardy that I would cite him for contempt of court and that
if he continued talking, I would direct the sheriffs to take him into custody.
Hardy replied, “
You are violating my rights as
a man. I want a jury, as is my right. It is my right. It is the law…” I
asked for silence. Hardy continued speaking. I then cited Hardy in contempt of
court and had the sheriffs arrest him. The sheriffs took Hardy to the
courthouse cells, and the court took its morning break.

[84]      When
the court reconvened, the prosecutor applied to continue the trial in Hardy’s
absence. I dismissed the prosecutor’s application and had Hardy brought into
the courtroom. I was hopeful that Hardy would return to court, sit at the
counsel’s table, and listen to me when I gave an order, not talk over me, and
not continue with the pseudo-legal arguments. My hopes were disappointed as
Hardy immediately returned to talking and making pseudo-legal statements and
arguments. Hardy would not be silenced, so I had him returned to cells.

[85]      I
ordered the release of Hardy on a release order requiring Hardy to return to
Prince Rupert courtroom 200 at 11:30 a.m. or appear in courtroom 200 by
videoconferencing at 11:30 a.m. Hardy elected to appear personally in the
courtroom at 11:30 a.m. When the court recommenced, I offered Hardy the
opportunity to purge the contempt of court citation by apologizing to the
court. Hardy accepted the opportunity and apologized,

But you know what? I
have no problem apologizing. I apologize to every man and woman here, who are
bearing witness to this. And I love everyone here. I love everyone here, and I
ask for forgiveness. And I thank everyone here.

[86]      I
accepted Hardy’s apology and purged the contempt of court citation.
Unfortunately, rather than our recommencing the trial, Hardy immediately
continued with his disruptive behaviour, designed to stop the trial from
proceeding. Hardy proceeded to read from a script and continued to speak over
me, despite my directing Hardy not to speak.

[87]      In
a rambling speech, Hardy claimed, among other things, that:

1.         He
is a peaceful, honourable man.

2.         He
is not a person, a human being, or any of that.

3.         He
is a man of mankind.

4.         He is
entitled to a trial by jury to press his claim of trespass and wrongs committed
against him.

5.         He
is not present for the legal court.

6.         He
is not interested in participating.

7.         As
the case judge, I do not have the right to make a ruling.

8.         As
the case judge, I do not have the jurisdiction to judge him.

9.         He is not
part of the legal society.

[88]      As
the prosecution had yet to start the examination of its first witness and we
were approaching the scheduled time for the lunch break, I cut Hardy off and
urged Hardy to speak with a lawyer over the lunch break. Hardy not only
rejected my suggestion that he talk with a lawyer but brought up the subject of
masks,

There’s no way I’m
getting any legal advice. I’m not part of the bar association. We are mankind
seated as jury is the law. Now, if the jury decides that this mask mandate and
this kind of nonsense is redundant and stupid — they can order jury
nullification and get rid of that kind of nonsense.

[89]       It
was clear from Hardy’s conduct and defiance of the court process that Hardy
desired to lessen societal respect for the courts and substantially interfere
with the administration of justice.

[90]      When
we returned to court approximately two hours and twenty minutes later, I
delivered Ruling Re: Section 650(2) of the Criminal Code, published at R.
v. Hardy
,
2022 BCPC 190. I explained to Hardy that he had the right to be
present in the courtroom, but the right was not absolute. I gave Hardy three
choices:

1.         Act
dignifiedly, heed the court’s orders and directions, and participate in the
trial process.

2.         Continue
to engage in the same behaviour as he had in the morning session, which would
leave me with no choice but to order him to accompany the sheriff to the
courthouse cells, where he would be linked into the courtroom by closed circuit
TV. From the courthouse cells, he would be able to hear and see the witnesses
and court proceedings. He would also have the right to cross-examine the
witnesses called by the prosecution.

3.         Continue
engaging in the same behaviour as he did in the morning session. If he refuses
to accompany the sheriff to the courthouse cells, I may find him in contempt of
court and have him arrested and transported to the courthouse cells under
arrest.

[91]      I
also explained to Hardy that if he wished to speak with a lawyer at any time, I
would stand down the court so that Hardy could do so. In the alternative, I
explained that I could also grant the prosecutor’s earlier request to proceed
with the trial in Hardy’s absence.

[92]      My
second ruling made no difference to Hardy.

[93]      I
tried to have the trial recommence, but Hardy would not allow it. Having
determined that Hardy had no wish to participate in the trial process in a
dignified manner or heed the orders and directions of the court, I asked Hardy
if he would like to accompany the sheriffs to the video room downstairs in the
area of the cells. He started passing documents to the sheriff and stated,

I’m speaking now, and
you’re cutting me off like last time. I’d like to hand a copy to the sheriff.
Please give a copy to the Crown. To the man known as Kyle Schille. And the man
known as, the man acting as judge, known as Calvin – known as David Peterson on
and for the record.

[94]     
I interrupted Hardy and asked him again if he
wanted to go downstairs with the sheriffs. Hardy ignored me and continued
speaking. I asked Hardy, “Would you like the opportunity to speak to a
lawyer before I find you in contempt of court?” Hardy replied, “I
have a right to a trial by jury as is my right.”

[95]      Having
already wasted a morning of the court’s time — and having given Hardy
approximately two-hours and twenty-minutes to change his mind about speaking
with a lawyer — I concluded that the only way I was going to move the trial
forward was to utilize the rare summary procedure known as in facie
contempt of court instanter. I had warned Hardy. I had provided Hardy
with the opportunity to consult legal counsel. Any other types of procedural
steps or delays would, in my opinion, not have changed Hardy’s behaviour.
Therefore, I found Hardy guilty of in facie contempt of court and had
the sheriffs take him into custody.

[96]      Rather
than sentence Hardy immediately for contempt of court, as usual when a judge
utilizes the rare contempt of court instanter summary procedure, I had
Hardy taken into custody. I then stood court down.

[97]      Once
the court was reconvened, with Hardy appearing by videoconferencing from the
courthouse cells, I remanded Hardy in custody to the following day so that we
could continue with the substantive obstruction of peace officers trial and
also fix a date for the contempt of court sentencing. I believed that by
delaying the contempt of court sentencing, Hardy might avail himself of legal
counsel.

[98]      I
also concluded that this case had become one of the rare cases where the
appointment of amicus curiae was necessary to maintain the orderly
conduct of the substantive trial and the contempt of court sentencing. I was
concerned about avoiding further delay in the proceedings. I ordered that the
Attorney General of British Columbia appoint an amicus
curiae
to assist the court in ensuring that Hardy had a fair trial and that all issues
were properly placed before the court, including any issues that were
beneficial to Hardy.

September
2, 2022

[99]      Early
in the proceedings on September 2, 2022, while discussing with the prosecutor
my having appointed amicus curiae on September 1, 2022, to assist the
court, Hardy interrupted me and stated, “I’m not Cameron Hardy. I demand a
trial by jury.” I told Hardy that I had heard his mantra and that his
mantra was not going to change anything. He then stated, “You have
unlawfully detained me, confined me, and extorted me. I’ve done nothing
wrong.”

[100]   As
the morning progressed, and it became apparent that Hardy would continue
disrupting the court and not comply with my order disallowing OPCA-type
statements, I had the sheriffs take Hardy downstairs to the courthouse cell
with the video conferencing equipment. Hardy immediately exclaimed that he
would not participate further in the court proceedings. I then detained him on
the contempt of court. Before he left the courtroom, while the sheriffs were
transferring him from the prisoner’s box to cells, Hardy expressed his
displeasure with my decision to send him back down to cells, shouting out,
“I will have my day in court.”

[101]   I
turned and asked the prosecutor if there were any reasons the Crown would want
to make an application to revoke Hardy’s bail on the substantive charge. The
prosecutor replied,

Yes, Your Honour. If he
is going to be in custody on the contempt charge, Crown would apply to revoke
on his other outstanding matter. I received word this morning from probation as
well that the man referred to as Cameron Hardy has not been reporting to his
bail supervisor. So on that basis, a 512 warrant was approved by another Crown,
but I held off on that before it was pushed through. I, of course, knew that
Mr. Hardy was in custody, and I can provide that information to Your Honour
directly, and it could be dealt with that way.

I then stood the court down so Hardy could
participate in the proceedings via video from the courthouse cells.

[102]  
When the court reconvened, the following
exchange occurred between the court and the prosecutor:

CNSL
K. SCHILLE: Your Honour, Schille, first initial K. for the Provincial Crown.
Recalling the matter of Cameron Hardy, Court File 30766-1. The man commonly
referred to as Cameron is by video. I should inform Your Honour at the outset,
I have been provided some relevant information by the man commonly referred to
as Cameron’s friends and family. I have been informed that the man commonly
referred to as Cameron’s mother is extremely sick at the hospital and has been
for the last six months. So that may explain some of the conduct in relation to
the non-reporting.

THE
COURT: All right. So what is the Crown’s position then? Are you seeking to have
the January release order revoked or not then?

CNSL K. SCHILLE: Your
Honour, with that information in mind, Crown is content for the current release
order to stand. In fact, I suppose the reporting condition that was breached is
likely not necessary in the circumstances. Mr. Hardy has showed up to his court
dates. I think hopefully if there is a further date, an amicus will be
appointed. 

[103]   In
light of the BC Prosecution Service changing its position to revoke bail for Hardy
on the substantive charge, I then inquired what the BC Prosecution Service’s
position was regarding bail for Hardy for the in facie contempt of
court. In reply, the prosecutor submitted,

Yes, Your Honour.
Crown’s position is that bail would be appropriate on both matters. I do not
think there is a primary or secondary ground risk there.

[104]   In
light of the BC Prosecution Service’s position on bail, I released Hardy on two
Release Orders: one for the substantive charge and one for the in facie
contempt of court. Hardy’s matters were adjourned to September 9, 2022, for
three purposes:

1.         To
set a date with the Judicial Case Manager for the punishment phase of the in
facie
contempt of court finding;

2.         To
determine if an amicus
curiae has been appointed for
Hardy; and

3.         To set dates
for the continuation of the substantive trial.

September
9, 2022

[105]   Hardy
did not show up for court on September 9, 2022. In his absence, and before
dealing with the type of warrants to issue in response, the court addressed my
appointing an amicus curiae.

[106]   Counsel
for the Attorney General of British Columbia made submissions. As a result of
the submissions, I changed the terms of my order appointing an amicus curiae
to read as requested by the Attorney General.

[107]   After
making the amended order appointing an amicus curiae, at the request of
counsel for the Attorney General of British Columbia and with the consent of
Andrea Turton, K.C., I appointed Miss Turton, K.C., as the amicus curiae
for both the substantive matter and for the contempt of court sentencing. 

[108]   The
court then discussed what to do about Hardy’s failure to attend court. In doing
so, I asked the prosecutor and amicus curiae,

Now, what am I to do
about the fact that I am — do not have the accused here? He was released out
of custody without signing the documents. He was sitting with his back to me on
the video with his hands over his ears, and although he had a very strong
representation in the gallery of the courtroom, I am not prepared to take any
kind of judicial notice that he would have known from somebody other than
myself what his returnable date is, since he did not sign the papers and would
not interact with the justice of the peace.

[109]   In
response to concerns raised by the amicus curiae, I opined:

The
problem with me going to an unendorsed warrant, quite frankly — if I wanted
this man in custody, I wouldn’t have given him bail last Friday. That’s simple.
That’s just going to make — I’m not going to penalize him ahead of hearing
from yourself and Crown what you think the appropriate penalty is, and the
detention order, I think, in his mind — even though those of us that work
within the legal system may have a different view, I think, in his mind, he
would see that as the punishment he’s receiving for the contempt, and I want to
make it clear that it wasn’t punishment for the contempt and you’ve got — he’s
gotten bail on that.

So if we do an
unendorsed warrant, I’ll be frank, my fear is he gets in front of a different
judge and that judge just detains him, and now we’re left with him detained and
now we’ve moved to an in-custody trial, and we’ll have to move quickly, so
again, no point in fixing any dates today.

[110]   Ultimately,
as the prosecutor and the amicus curiae agreed with the appropriateness
of endorsed warrants for Hardy, endorsed warrants, with a special endorsement,
were issued:

There
will be an endorsed warrant in relation to the contempt of court. There will be
an endorsed warrant in relation to the substantive obstruction charge. I will
change the endorsement on it to read that he may be released from police
custody upon being told the dates returnable for court, place returnable for
court, and time returnable for court in relation to both the contempt of court
sentencing and the substantive obstruction charge. 

I am going to also
require that, in the Affidavit of Service, the individual who serves Cameron
Hardy confirm in the Affidavit of Service that they verbally told him and were
satisfied that he knows the date, time, and place for his next court
appearances.

October
25, 2022

[111]   Constable
Daniels allegedly arrested Hardy for the endorsed warrants on October 25, 2022,
in Richmond, British Columbia. Constable Daniels gave Hardy an Appearance
Notice
for 9 a.m. on November 23, 2022, in the Prince Rupert Courthouse
Initial Appearance Courtroom and then released Hardy.

November
23, 2022

[112]   Hardy
appeared by telephone in court on November 23, 2022. He identified himself as
“a man
known as Cameron Hardy.” Shortly after the file
was called in court, the following exchange occurred between Hardy and the
Judicial Case Manager:

THE
COURT: Thank you. Please go ahead, Mr. Hardy.

HARDY:
Well, you guys asked me to be here. So, how can I help you? I thought this
matter was discharged — concluded –

THE
COURT: On —

HARDY: — but
apparently you guys still have an issue with me. So, [indiscernible/overlapping
speakers].

[113]   Later,
when the prosecutor suggested that a trial continuation date of February 21,
2023, had been prearranged, Hardy and the Judicial Case Manager had the
following interchange:

THE
COURT: Mr. Hardy, it is my intention to set a continuation for February 21 in
Prince Rupert, courtroom 200 with Judge Patterson. Are you available for that
date?

HARDY:
I will be present to — I would prefer something further out. If possible in
March. I am out of country, and I do have a lot of things booked — paid for.
So to not incur cost, March would work better for me, and I would be present to
press a claim at open court for a trial by jury, as is my right, as I’ve been
saying all along. Not interested in participating in the legal side of the
court

THE
COURT: So —

HARDY: —
[indiscernible/overlapping speakers] before a jury of my peers.

[114]   Near
the end of the court appearance, when asked if April 18, 2023, would work for
him, Hardy and the Judicial Case Manager had the following exchange:

HARDY:
I think we’ll require a couple days in jury selection and all that, but I’ll be
back before that date for sure and I’ll be [indiscernible/remote audio] claim
and updating with cost and expenses and all that. So, yeah, April 18th, 19th,
two days. That’s what we’d be doing? [Indiscernible/overlapping speakers].

THE
COURT: No. I’m setting only one date. It will be April 18 at 9:30 in courtroom
200. That’s the instructions that I have from the judge, is to set one day.

HARDY: Okay. That’s
okay. I’ll just press my claim beforehand and I’ll require two days, but we can
just talk about that when I get back to town.

April
18, 2023 – Hardy’s Fourth Scheduled Trial Date

[115]   When
court files 30766-1 and 30766-2 were called, Hardy entered the courtroom and
walked calmly to the counsels’ table. Despite being asked by a sheriff to
remove the grey toque he was wearing on his head, he did not do so. He sat
down.

[116]   Hardy
identified himself as “I am man known as Cameron Hardy. I am here to press a
claim before this court before a trial by jury.” I then cut Hardy off and
reminded him of my September 1, 2022, ruling that no pseudo-legal arguments
would be allowed. Hardy immediately replied, “My intention is to press a
claim…” I cut Hardy off and revoked his bail on court file 30766-2, as it was
immediately apparent to me that Hardy had no intention of abiding by my earlier
ruling and that he would continue with his OPCA-theory type arguments.

[117]   The
sheriffs took Hardy into custody. We stood the court down to allow Hardy to participate
in his sentencing by video from the courthouse cells.

[118]   When
court recommenced, Hardy elected to sit with his back to the video camera and
with his fingers in his ears. He refused to participate in the sentencing
proceedings and made no submissions to the court.

[119]   The
BC Prosecution Service took “no position” on the contempt of court sentencing. Amicus
curiae did not make any submissions as to the appropriate sentence I
should impose for the contempt of court.

V.        FURTHER DISCUSSION

[120]   Justice
McLachlin, as she then was, in
United Nurses of Alberta v.
Alberta (Attorney General)
, 1992 CanLII 99 (SCC),
observed
,

Both civil and criminal
contempt of court rest on the power of the court to uphold its dignity and
process.  The rule of law is at the heart of our society; without it there
can be neither peace, nor order nor good government.  The rule of law is
directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and
maintain their dignity and respect.  To maintain their process and respect,
courts since the 12th century have exercised the power to punish for contempt
of court.

The power to deal with
contempt as part of the inherent and essential jurisdiction of the courts has
existed, it is said, as long as the courts themselves (see Fox, The
History of Contempt of Court
, 1972, p. 1). This power was necessary, and
remains so, to enable the orderly conduct of the court’s business and to
prevent interference with the court’s proceedings. Contempt powers existed for
both superior courts and courts of inferior jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts was limited to contempt in the face, or in the presence,
of the court…

[122]   Justice
Laskin of the Ontario Court of Appeal provided a brief background to the law of
contempt of court
in R. v. Glasner1994 CanLII 3444 (ON CA),

Contempt
of court is a common law crime, preserved as such by s. 9 of
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is a sanction that
courts have imposed for centuries to uphold the public’s confidence in and
respect for the administration of justice:
see United Nurses of Alberta v.
Alberta (Attorney General)
1992 CanLII 99 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901
at pp. 930-32,
9 C.R.R. (2d) 29, per McLachlin J.

Although
criminal contempts may take a variety of forms, as Lord Diplock said in A.-G.
v. Leveller Magazine Ltd.
[1979] A.C. 440
at p. 449,
[1979] 1 All E.R. 745 (H.L.)
:

.
. . they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with
the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally
as a continuing process.

Several decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada have discussed the definition of criminal contempt.
In substance, the offence consists of acts which obstruct or interfere with the
administration of justice or which tend to do so and acts which show disrespect
for the court and its processes…

[123]   In
R. v. Kopyto, 1987 CanLII 176 (ON CA), Justice Cory, as he then was,
provided a brief outline of the law concerning criminal contempt of court
generally and the scandalization of the court in particular:

…There
are two types of conduct which come within the scope of criminal contempt.
Firstly, there is contempt in the face of the court. This type of offence
encompasses any word spoken or act done in or in the precinct of the court
which obstructs or interferes with the due administration of justice or is
calculated to do so. It would include assaults committed in the court, insults
to the court made in the presence of the court, interruption of court
proceedings, a refusal of a witness to be sworn or, after being sworn, refusal
to answer. Secondly, the offence may be committed by acts which are committed
outside the court. Contempt not in the face of the court includes words spoken
or published or acts done which are intended to interfere or are likely to
interfere with the fair administration of justice. Examples of that type of
contempt are publications which are intended or are likely to prejudice the fair
trial or conduct of a criminal or civil proceeding or publications which
scandalize or otherwise lower the authority of the court, and acts which would
obstruct persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice:
see R. v.
Cohn
(1984), 1984 CanLII 43 (ON CA), 48 O.R. (2d) 65 at pp. 70-1, 13
D.L.R. (4th) 680
at pp. 685-6, 15 C.C.C. (3d) 150 at p. 156 (C.A.).

R.
v. Gray
[1900] 2 Q.B. 36, was the first case to hold that
it is a criminal offence to bring the administration of justice into disrepute
by scandalizing the court, that is to say by performing an act or uttering
words that are calculated to bring a court into contempt or lower its
authority. In that case Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. defined the offence, at
p. 40, in the following words:

Any
act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the
Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is
one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of
the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category
which Lord Hardwicke L.C. characterised as “scandalising a Court or a
judge.” That description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject
to one and an important qualification. Judges and Courts are alike open to
criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any
judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would
treat that as contempt of Court. The law ought not to be astute in such cases
to criticise adversely what under such circumstances and with such an object is
published; but it is to be remembered that in this matter the liberty of the
press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen.
Now, as I have said, no one has suggested that this is not a contempt of Court,
and nobody has suggested, or could suggest, that it falls within the right of
public criticism in the sense I have described. It is not criticism, I repeat
that it is personal scurrilous abuse of a judge as a judge.

The
principle thus enunciated in R. v. Gray, supra, was adopted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Duncan
(1958), 1957 CanLII 90
(SCC),
11 D.L.R. (2d) 616, [1958] S.C.R. 41. The Supreme Court was there
dealing with statements made in court by Mr. Duncan, who had objected to one of
the justices sitting on the Appeal which he was about to argue. The act
complained of might have been categorized as one of contempt in the face of the
court. None the less, Chief Justice Kerwin cited with approval and quoted from R.
v. Gray
. At p. 618 D.L.R., p. 44 S.C.R., of Chief Justice Kerwin’s reasons
the following appears:

It
has been stated by Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. in R. v. Gray
[1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at p. 40, that Judges and
Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation
is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no
Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court. However, Lord Russell had
already pointed out that any act done calculated to bring a Court into contempt
or to lower its authority is a contempt of Court and belongs to that category
which Lord Chancellor Hardwicke had as early as 1742 characterized as
“scandalising a Court or a judge”. The matter is put succinctly in 8
Hals., 3rd ed., p. 5: “The power to fine and imprison for a contempt
committed in the face of the court is a necessary incident to every court of
justice. It is a contempt of any court of justice to disturb and obstruct the
court by insulting it in its presence and at a time when it is actually sitting
… It is not from any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals that
insults to judges are not allowed, but because there is imposed upon the court
the duty of preventing brevi manu any attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice.”

[124]   The
difference in knowledge of the facts lies at the heart of the difference
between in facie and ex facie contempt of court. Although written
in
dissent, Justice Laskin’s opinion in McKeown v. The Queen, 1971
CanLII 194
(SCC), sets out neatly the accepted critical difference on pages
447-8:

The
presumption of innocence applies in criminal contempts not in the face of the
Court, and the alleged contemnor must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

            …..

Contempt in the face of
the Court is, in my view, distinguished from contempt not in the face of the
court, on the footing that all the circumstances of the alleged contempt are in
the personal knowledge of the Court. The presiding judge can then deal
summarily with the matter without embarrassment of having to be a witness to
issues of fact which may be in dispute because of events occurring outside.

[125]   Since
ex facie contempt of court necessarily involves factual circumstances
outside the judge’s direct knowledge, the judge cannot find guilt within the
context of the court proceedings. The same is not true for in facie
contempt of court, as the adjudicating judge has personal knowledge of the
facts related to the contempt of court. For in facie contempt of the
court, the evidence exists in front of the court in a manner that allows it to
conduct summary proceedings independently.

[126]   The
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson,
1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, in paragraph 87, confirms the point:

87        Second,
contempt not in the face of the court is generally prosecuted like any other
crime by the Attorney General, who gathers the evidence and presents the case
to the court.  This follows from the fact that the contempt is not
committed in the presence of the court.  Unlike contempt in facie,
which Parliament has left within the purview of the court where it was
committed, the court whose order has been allegedly traversed will usually have
no evidence itself of ex facie contempt, and cannot pursue it
without the intervention of the Attorney General.  For example, in the
case at bar, the superior court judge had no personal knowledge of who had
demonstrated, let alone when or where the injunction was supposedly
violated.  As in the case of any other crime, trial of the contempt was
dependent on a case presented by the prosecution…

[127]   Although
obiter dictum, approximately five weeks after I found Hardy guilty
of criminal contempt in the face of the court, the Alberta Court of Appeal
rendered its
decision in R v Royal, 2022 ABCA 330. During the Covid-19
pandemic, the appellant, a practicing lawyer, refused
to wear a mask as directed by a Provincial Court Judge during a three-day
criminal trial
. Rather than use the instanter or summary
procedure I used in the present case, the Provincial Court Judge referred the
contempt hearing to another Provincial Court Judge. The second judge found that
the appellant had been in contempt.
Relying on R. v Doz, 1987
CanLII 32
(SCC), the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that
the second Provincial Court Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding
for contempt that originated before another Provincial Court Judge. According
to the majority, the options were for the initial Provincial Court Judge to
have used the same instanter or summary procedure I used or to refer the
matter to a superior court judge for their consideration.

Actus
Reus
and Mens Rea

[128]   Numerous
authorities confirm that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and is not an absolute or strict liability offence. Contempt of court
requires mens rea. The actus reus of contempt of court is conduct
that seriously interferes with or obstructs the administration of justice or
causes a genuine risk of interference or obstruction.

[129]   In
recapitulating the nature of the common law crime of contempt as set out
in United
Nurses of Alberta
, Judge
Lefever
in R. v. Jackson, 2002
ABPC 135
, summarized:

[63]
I take from U.N.A. that the common law crime of contempt nevertheless
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the actus reus and of the
mens rea, although the requisite mens rea can be inferred from
all the surrounding circumstances.

[64] U.N.A. dealt
with an ex facie contempt in which the “public” nature of the allegedly
contumacious behaviour was a critical element. In the context of an in facie
contempt, a public act outside the precinct of the court is not required.
What is required however is an act committed in the face of the court, by an
accused, with knowledge that the act “will tend to depreciate the authority of
the court.”…

Principles
and Purposes of Sentencing for Contempt of Court

[130]   In
paragraph 53 of Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v. Mivasair,
2019 BCCA 156,
our Court of Appeal set out the principles and purposes of sentencing in the
criminal contempt of court context:

[53]      In short, in cases of criminal contempt, the concept of
parity, as applied to the circumstances of the offence, must take into account
the persistence of the “open, continuous and flagrant violation of a court
order.” The longer the violation continues, the greater the need for general
deterrence to preserve the rule of law. The suggestion that the concept of
parity depends upon a contemnor’s understanding of the severity of the sentence
he or she will receive fails to take into account the nature of the offence and
relevance of general deterrence as a sentencing principle for that offence.

…..

[55]      Contempt of court is the only remaining common law
offence in Canada. As such, sentencing is not governed by the principles
in s. 718 of the Code, though they provide a useful
backdrop. Sections 718 and 718.1 of the Code provide:

718 The fundamental
purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime
prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just,
peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of
the following objectives:

(a) to denounce
unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is
caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the
offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate
offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in
rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide
reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a
sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to
victims or to the community.

…..

718.1 A
sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of
responsibility of the offender.

[56]      The objectives of separating offenders from society and
providing reparation to victims are generally not applicable to sentencing in
contempt cases. Rehabilitation is often important in civil contempt cases,
where the Court is primarily concerned with securing compliance with its
orders: Larkin v. Glase
2009 BCCA 321 at para. 49.
However
in Larkin, Justice Chiasson comments that even in cases of
civil contempt deterrence is more important than rehabilitation (at
para. 51).

[57]      Denunciation and deterrence are the principal
sentencing objectives in criminal contempt cases. Chief Justice Farris described
the underlying rationale in Canadian
Transport (U.K.) Ltd. v. Alsbury
 
(1952), 1952 CanLII 430
(BC SC),
6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 473 at 478 (B.C.S.C.), aff’d 1952 CanLII 218
(BC CA),
[1953] 1 D.L.R. 385 (C.A.), aff’d 1953 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1953] 1
S.C.R. 516
:

One
law broken and the breach thereof ignored is but an invitation to ignore
further laws and this, if continued, can only result in the breakdown of the
freedom under the law which we so greatly prize.

[58]      General deterrence was the primary objective of sentencing
in MacMillan Bloedel, where the focus was likewise on securing
respect for the rule of law. A summary of sentencing principles for contempt
was set out in Transportaction Lease Systems Inc. v. Virdi
2009
BCSC 695
 at para. 17citing Health Care Corp. of
St. John’s v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private
Employees
[2001] N.J. No. 17
(S.C.T.D.)
at para. 2
:

1.
The inherent jurisdiction of the court, as a superior court, allows for the
imposition of a wide range of penalties for civil and criminal contempt;

2.
Deterrence, both general and specific, but especially general deterrence, as
well as denunciation, are the most important factors to be considered in the
imposition of penalties for civil, as well as criminal, contempt;

..…

9.
In setting the overall level of penalty, the court may take account of the
level of penalty imposed in similar cases in the past and may adjust the
penalty upwards or downwards, depending on the court’s assessment as to whether
previous levels of penalty have had an effective general deterrent effect; …

[59]      In Lacasse,
the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that “proportionality is determined both
on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and
to the offence committed by the accused, and by comparison with sentences
imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
Individualization and parity of sentences must be reconciled for a sentence to
be proportionate”: at para. 53. It is not unusual for custodial sentences
to be applied for criminal contempt: see Justice Burnyeat’s review of British
Columbia decisions where contemnors were given carceral sentences in Transportaction
Lease Systems 
at para. 13. As stated by McLachlin J., “[t]here is
no doubt that criminal contempt may result in imprisonment, constituting a
denial of liberty”: United Nurses at 930. Indeed, in The
Law of Contempt in Canada
 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), Jeffery Miller
states “the general principle is that criminal contempts are to be answered with
penal sanctions” (at 129).

Court’s
Decision to Not Immediately Sentence Hardy on September 1, 2022

[131]   While
they are not cases involving OPCA representations, I am aware of two reported
cases from Manitoba where judges have convicted for in facie contempt of
court and then adjourned the sentencing to a later date: R. v. Amyotte and
Abdullah
,
2008 MBCA 48 and R. v. Woodhouse and Katcheconias, 2013
MBQB 146
.

[132]   In
Amyotte and Abdullah, the Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld a trial
decision in which a judge convicted two subpoenaed witnesses of in facie
contempt of court for refusing to be sworn to testify. At the request of the
witnesses’ counsel, the trial judge adjourned sentencing for the contempt of
court until after the trial the witnesses were set to testify in concluded. The
Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to convict the
appellants and further implicitly approved of the adjournment of sentencing by
contemplating that the trial judge adjourned the sentencing to allow the witnesses
to change their minds and still testify at a later opportunity.

[133]   The
facts
in Amyotte and Abdullah are analogous to those in the present case
insofar as, in both cases, the court gave the contemptuous party multiple
opportunities to consult counsel and purge their contempt. While Hardy did not
speak to counsel, I provided him numerous opportunities to do so, alongside
multiple breaks, including a two-hour and twenty-minute lunch break analogous
to that
in Amyotte and Abdullah. Hardy was allowed the option to appear
through closed-circuit TV videoconferencing from the cells, and, had he sought
it, I would have considered a second opportunity for him to purge his contempt.

[134]   In
both cases, the sentencings were adjourned to allow the contemptuous party to
improve their legal circumstances. So while Hardy did not speak with counsel, I
provided him with repeated opportunities to halt the court process and consult
with a lawyer: before, during, and after the events that led to convicting him
of contempt.

[135]   In
Woodhouse and Katcheconias, during the trial, the court convicted a
witness who refused to testify of contempt of court without a show cause
hearing and then adjourned the sentencing until after the completion of the
trial. The court did so after recessing twice, once during a preliminary
hearing and once during the trial proper, for the contemptuous party to meet
with counsel.

[136]   Unfortunately,
instead of submitting to the court’s legitimacy and wrapping up his substantive
trial in a timely manner, Hardy elected to continue with his refusal to
participate in a meaningful and constructive way, both on September 1, 2022,
and on the scheduled court dates that followed. He failed to attend court on
September 9, 2022, and then having been arrested claimed ignorance in court on
November 23, 2022, of the requirement for him to attend court on September 9,
2022. Furthermore, despite the court’s Ruling Re:
Organized
Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments
on September 1, 2022,
Hardy made OPCA arguments in subsequent court appearances.

Moral
Blameworthiness

[137]   Moral
blameworthiness is measured by the offence’s gravity and the offender’s degree
of responsibility.

[138]   To
believe that one is exempt from the law because of how they self-identify and
because they espouse OPCA beliefs is not only outrageous but creates great harm
to the community as others consider whether a magical “get out of jail free
card” exists, and after that stop paying taxes, fail to abide by laws and
public health orders, and waste valuable court resources with nonsensical OPCA
arguments.

i.         the
actions of Hardy on September 1, 2022, on their own, and in the context of his
actions before and after September 1, 2022,

ii.         the
harm to the trial process, and

iii.        the harm to
society at large,

undoubtedly,
Hardy’s moral blameworthiness is at the highest end of the spectrum.

Aggravating
and Mitigating Factors

[140]   The
aggravating factors include:

1.         The
brazen nature of Hardy’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Canadian
court system and his reliance upon nonsensical OPCA-type arguments.

2.         Hardy’s
continued refusal to comply with the orders and directions of the court.

3.         Hardy’s
delay tactics on September 1, 2022, resulted in the loss of two days of
scheduled trial time.

[141]   The
mitigating factors include:

1.         Hardy
has no criminal record.

Sentencing
Range for Contempt of Court

[142]   There
is little case law to draw on for directly analogous sentencing ranges,
especially accounting for the OPCA aspect of Hardy’s case.

[143]   There
have been cases of criminal contempt in the face of the court for disruptive
and disrespectful behaviour, which I can draw on for a general range. I
caution, however, that the facts in some of the sentencing cases I discuss
below are not in the OPCA context and are not attacking the court’s legitimacy.
In the OPCA context, an even higher jail term may be required where the
offender fails to correct their ways and continues to reject the legitimacy of
the courts.

i.         British Columbia Securities
Commission v. Williams

[144]   Before
turning to the criminal contempt of court case law, I believe it is helpful to
review the case of fifty-seven-year-old Penko, an OPCA litigant. Although her
case arose from a civil contempt court finding: British Columbia Securities
Commission v. Williams,
unreported, December 31, 2018, Supreme Court of
British Columbia, docket L160324, Weatherill, SCJ., her case is instructive as
to the reality that jail will be the response for OPCA litigants who fail to
stop when requested by the court to do so. Penko’s debt to the British Columbia
Securities Commission arose out of her involvement in a Ponzi scheme. The
Commission imposed sanctions on her and registered its decision with the
Supreme Court for enforcement. Penko actively resisted collection efforts by
engaging in OPCA tactics in an effort to frustrate collection efforts. In short
Oral Reasons for Judgment, Justice Weatherill decided:

[1]
THE COURT: The elements of civil contempt for breach of a court order are:

i)
the existence of the order;

ii)
knowledge on the part of the alleged contemptor of the existence of the order
and its terms; and

iii)
the alleged contemptor did one or more acts amounting to disobedience of the
terms of the order.

[2]
I am satisfied on the evidence before me that all three elements of civil
contempt have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

[3]
This matter involves Ms. Penko, a judgment debtor, who has been found by the
British Columbia Securities Commission (“BCSC”) to be indebted to it in the sum
of $195,000 as of September 22, 2016. Post-judgment interest has been accruing
since that date, and the outstanding judgment now exceeds $200,000.

[4]
It is plain to me that Ms. Penko is of the view that neither BCSC nor this
court has any jurisdiction over her, and that she intends to steadfastly refuse
to submit to any jurisdiction of this court.

[5] Because I am more
than satisfied that any imposition of monetary penalty will be futile in this
case, I am going to order, because I think it is the only order available at
this point, that Ms. Penko be remanded in custody for 30 days commencing today,
that she give up her passport, and at the end of 30 days, she can reappear
before me and she will be given an opportunity to explain why her contempt of
this court has been purged. At that time if she is successful in doing so, we
will deal with how best to proceed with this matter.

[145]   I
turn to a survey of criminal contempt of court sentencing cases over the years.

ii.         R. v. Vallieres (No. 2)

[146]   In
R. v. Vallieres (No. 2),
1973 CanLII 1504 (QC CA), the Quebec Court of
Appeal upheld five charges of contempt in the face of court for abusive and
disrespectful language towards the judge occurring on separate days. In
considering the accused’s appeal of the length of the sentences imposed, the
Quebec Court of Appeal reduced the sentence of each count to time served:

From
this perspective, I would substitute:

(a)
to the sentence of six months plus one month imposed on January 19, 1970,
appealed by appeal 3318, a sentence of four months and one month concurrent
(the said sentences having been entirely served);

(b) to the consecutive
sentences of 6 months, 6 months and one month imposed on April 27 and 28, 1971,
and appealed by appeal 3687, two sentences of two months and 11 days and one
sentence of one month, all three concurrent and in any case having been served
already by the appellant.

Vallieres (No. 2)
suggests that a range from one month to six months imprisonment for contempt of
court is appropriate, depending on the severity of the contemptuous conduct.

iii.        R. v. Karim

[147]   In
R. v. Karim,
1994 CanLII 4635 (SK CA), the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reduced a sentence for contempt of court from six
months to two months because the appellant had been respectful and had
expressed regret at the hearing. Justice Cameron wrote the unanimous decision:

The appellant was
sentenced to two terms of imprisonment, one of ten months for intentionally
setting fire to a mattress in a correctional institute, and the other of six
months for contempt in the face of the Court, having told the sentencing judge,
Judge Lavoie, to “fuck off” and having later called him a
“bastard.”


Saying he was highly frustrated at the time of his appearance in Court, did not
fully appreciate the norms of behaviour in Canadian Courts, and has since come
to regret his disrespectful outbursts, the appellant asks that the six month sentence,
at least, be reduced.


In a report to this Court, Judge Lavoie said he imposed the six month sentence
to demonstrate to the accused the need for appropriate behaviour in the
Courts.  He went on to recommend that it be reassessed in the light of its
impact, if any, upon the man’s attitude.


Given the appellant’s respectful conduct before us, together with his
expressions of regret, we are satisfied that the contempt sentence has its
desired effect, and accordingly we have decided to reduce it from six to two
months.


There is no basis for interfering with the other sentence. It was a fit one in
the circumstances.


It follows, then, that the ten month sentence will stand, and that the other
will be reduced to two months to be served concurrently with another, similar
sentence, but consecutively to the ten month sentence.  In all the
appellant will serve a term of imprisonment of 12 months for these offences.

iv.        Amyotte
and Abdullah

[148]   In
R. v. Amyotte and Abdullah, the Manitoba Court of Appeal referenced the
sentencing and appeal of Jacob, the third witness that refused to testify in
the trial:
see R. v. Jacob, 2008 MBCA 7. Chief Justice Scott noted:

7         On
June 7th, the appellants refused transportation to the court
house from the jail where they were
held. Jacob did attend before the
court, but refused to be sworn, affirm or testify. 
Despite the court’s
urging,
Jacob declined to change his mind and requested that he be sentenced
right away.  The matter was put over to the next day to enable him, at the
court’s insistence, to obtain counsel.  An experienced criminal defence
counsel appeared later that day as amicus curiae to offer
advice to Jacob and advised the court that she would speak with the appellants
as well as Jacob.

8         The
next morning, June 8th, Jacob again refused to testify. 
Counsel confirmed that she had advised him of his rights and options.  He
was then convicted of contempt.  The sentencing hearing promptly followed
and Jacob was sentenced to three years in jail with a recommendation for no
parole eligibility.

[149]   The
trial judge went on to sentence Abdullah and Amyotte, both of whom were apparently
not strangers to the criminal justice system:

14        He concluded that general
deterrence was the most important factor in the sentencing; in the result, the
appellant Abdullah was sentenced to a period of 42 months in jail, and Amyotte
48 months, with a recommendation that there be no early release or
parole.  The difference in the two sentences was accounted for by the fact
that the appellant Abdullah’s background was somewhat more favourable than that
of Amyotte.

15        In
due course, Jacob appealed his sentence.  On January 24, 2008, this
court reduced the sentence from three years to two on the basis that it was
unfit because “it is simply too long” (
2008 MBCA 7 at
para. 
31).

[150]   The
sentencing appeals of Abdullah and Amyotte were also ultimately successful,
with the Manitoba Court of Appeal reducing their sentences to three years:

32        With respect
to the sentence, in my opinion a sentence of 36 months for each of the
appellants is appropriate in the circumstances.  I agree with counsel for
the appellants that following this court’s 
decision in Jacob, sentences of 42 and
48 months, notwithstanding the seriousness and contemptuous conduct of the
appellants, are simply too long.

v.         R. v.
McDowell

[151]   Justice
McEwan found the defendant guilty of contempt of court on two occasions, as
described in R. v. McDowell, 2015 BCSC 1477:

…I am satisfied on the
basis of the law respecting contempt that on two occasions, on
December 15th, 2014, and on December 19th, 2014, when you were cited
by Mr. Justice Betton for contempt, that you had in fact advanced your
notion of what was relevant and necessary to make your points on your case to a
degree that infringed upon the appropriate boundaries within which court
proceedings in this country are conducted, and that in embarking on a very
serious and sustained ad hominem — that is against the
person attacked — on the presiding justice, you committed a contempt in the
face of the court.

Justice McEwan then sentenced an
apologetic McDowell
in R. v. McDowell, 2015 BCSC 1478, as follows:

[1]        THE COURT:  I have considered the very fair
submission made by the Crown in this matter.  I have considered what
Mr. McDowell says on his own behalf.

[2]        I think part of the problem in this case proceeds from
Mr. McDowell’s wholly erroneous estimation of the effect he has in making
his submissions before the court and in making his submissions before
Mr. Justice Betton.

[3]        By any objective standard, the behaviour was extreme
and clearly contemptuous.  Despite warnings that he was treading on thin
ice, Mr. McDowell continued to press his points when his position should
have been to object, state his objection, accept the authority of the court,
and move on, saving his concerns for the appeal court, if that’s what he
chooses to do.

[4]        Rather than do that, he treated the jury in this matter
to a defiant spectacle, where it was clear he refused the authority of the
court and had no concern at all for the appearance of the administration of
justice.

[5]        As I say, I accept that he did not estimate the degree
of harm that he was causing, but it is my duty to impose a sanction that not
only punishes Mr. McDowell for what he did, but that is sufficient to
recognize the seriousness of that behaviour so that it deters others.

[6]        Having carefully considered what I have been advised
and the submissions of the Crown, I sentence Mr. McDowell to 10 days
in jail upon each of the two citations for contempt.

[7]        The
time will be served concurrently, so that the total is 10 days.

[152]   Unlike
Hardy, McDowell did not deny the legitimacy of the court. Instead, he refused
the court’s authority, ignoring clear instructions from the judge, and had no
concern at all for the appearance of the administration of justice in front of
the jury. In doing so, McDowell did not appreciate the degree of harm that he
was causing by his contemptuous behaviour.

vi.        R. v. Asselin

[153]   In R. v. Asselin, 2019 MBCA 94, the Manitoba Court of
Appeal returned to the issue of sentencing for criminal contempt of court in
the context of a witness that refuses to testify. The trial judge imposed a
jail term of nine months. In upholding the nine-month jail term, the Manitoba
Court of Appeal decided:

[58]      In
this case, the trial judge described the aggravating factors as including the
fact that the trial was for a “grave personal violence offence” and the
appellant’s “brazen comments and attitude to prosecutors” (at
para 26).  He noted that the appellant effectively “dared” (ibid)
the prosecutors to have him arrested.  On the other hand, he recognised
that the offence was committed out of foolish disregard for the appellant’s
legal and moral duty as opposed to loyalty to a gang or an individual (see para
27).  In mitigation, he considered the appellant’s personal history,
finding him to be a contributing member of the community.  He stated that
he was not considering the appellant’s previous criminal record as a
factor.  He also did not consider the potential impact of the appellant’s
refusal to testify as he did not have evidence regarding that issue.

[59]      In light of
all of the above, the trial judge did not err in principle or law and the
sentence of nine months’ incarceration is not unfit.

vii.      R. c. Marion

[154]   In
R. c. Marion,
[2020] J.Q. no 10036, the Cour du Québec (Chambre
criminelle et pénale) convicted the defendant of contempt of court and
sentenced him to 21 days in prison. The defendant constantly interrupted the
judge and the lawyers, used a condescending tone, and made sarcastic quips and
comments whenever officers of the court attempted to explain his rights to him.
At the time of the delivery of the court’s decision, the defendant became angry
and shouted insults at the judge, leading to the contempt of court.

viii.      R. v.
Dhillon

[155]   In
R. v. Dhillon,
2021 BCCA 271, Justice DeWitt-Van Oosten, for a unanimous Court of Appeal,
affirmed the 30-day jail sentence for criminal contempt of court imposed by
Justice Holmes (now A.C.J.) in 2015 (see R. v. Dhillon,
2015 BCSC 1298).
Justice Holmes had convicted Dhillon of fai
ling
to comply with
former Chief Justice Brenner’s
order prohibiting publishing two defamatory blog posts on the Internet relating
to a trustee in bankruptcy.

[156]   As
noted by the Court of Appeal:

[26]      Punishment for criminal contempt is the “sole device by
which [a] court can ensure its own continued effectiveness in the struggle to
preserve the rule of law”: R. v. Bridges et al. (No. 2) 
(1989), 1989 CanLII 5321 (BC SC), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 154 (B.C.C.A.)
at 156, 
cited with approval in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.
v. Brown
, No. 
1994 CanLII 3254 (BC CA), 92
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.)
at para. 6.

[27]      A conviction for this offence is a serious matter,
irrespective of the context in which it arises. Criminal contempt requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender publicly defied or disobeyed
a court order, with intent, knowledge or recklessness as to the fact that the
defiance would tend to depreciate
the authority of the court: United Nurseof
Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General)
1992 CanLII 99 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 931–933MacMillan
Bloedel 
at para. 46.

[28]      Denunciation
and deterrence, both general and specific, attract heightened significance in
these cases. As a result, a custodial sentence is not anomalous, even for
contemnors with no prior criminal history. See Texada Land Corp. v.
Shebib et al
2002 BCCA 114 at
para. 
12Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v. Mivasair2019 BCCA 156 at paras. 51–52, 57, 59.

VI.      DECISION

[157]   Hardy’s
conduct has been reprehensible and an affront to the authority of the Court. I
do not doubt that Hardy said what he did and acted the way he did on September
1, 2022, to depreciate the court’s authority and to obstruct and bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. The actus reus and mens rea
were obvious and required immediate action from the court.

[158]   Since
September 1, 2022, Hardy’s continuing behaviour confirms that he has learned
nothing. As mentioned above, denunciation and deterrence are the principal
sentencing objectives in criminal contempt cases. Specific and general
deterrence both call for a significant penalty.

[159]   In
my view, the sentence I impose must reflect the high level of moral
blameworthiness of Hardy. In light of the planned, deliberate and ongoing
nature of Hardy’s contempt, an appropriate sentence for Hardy’s contempt on
September 1, 2022, should be greater than situations where a person has
committed contempt by refusing to be sworn or provide testimony. 

[160]   In
upholding a sentence of six months in jail, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
Regina (City) v Cunningham, 
1994
CarswellSask 233
, described some of the factors to consider when
sentencing an offender for criminal contempt of court who had ample opportunity to purge his criminal
contempt and thereby avoid the jail term:

In imposing a sentence
for criminal contempt the sentencing judge may properly take into consideration
the extent of the wilful and deliberate defiance of the Court’s order, the
seriousness of the consequences of the appellant’s contemptuous behaviour, the
necessity of effectively terminating the appellant’s defiance as required by
the public interest as well as the importance of deterring such conduct in the
future.  Given these standards or criteria, an appellate court should
respect the discretion of the sentencing judge unless error is demonstrated in
balancing the various considerations.  We find no such error in this case.

[161]   The
words of Justice Tilleman
in Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114,
confirm the same principles hold true when sentencing a person for contempt of
court related to OPCA misconduct:

[254]   The test identified in the appellate case law
is that a criminal contempt of court sanction is appropriate when an activity
constitutes a “clear and present danger”, “real and imminent
harm or threat to justice”. OPCA gurus sell and promote techniques
that damage the court. The judiciary regularly encounters litigants who attempt
to apply these techniques. Only a small fraction of those events are documented
in reported case law. This is not merely a theoretical issue, but one that is a
regular and unwelcome event.

[255]   Thus, though what Mr. Fearn says likely would
be preposterous, absurd, and probably offensive to the average Canadian, he is
one of a community of like-minded persons. In their eyes Mr. Fearn’s
“truths” are very real. To permit the business of interfering with
court processes to go unchallenged only reinforces this community’s misguided,
dystopian world perspective.

…..

[260]   Contempt of
court is a mechanism to curb OPCA misconduct that is directed to and interferes
with court operation and function. This response should be broad and
meaningful. That reflects this authority as an expression of the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court. That means that while freedom of expression is a
value respected and protected both under the common law and the Charter,
that right does not extend to speech and communication which is criminal, or is
intended to or injures the administration of justice and the rights of justice
system participants.

[162]   I
stress wholeheartedly that Hardy’s reliance on OPCA theory was wrong. He
attempted to circumvent justice system procedures. His arguments were not
merely legally false but often just plain stupid. Hardy’s defence was vexatious
and frivolous. He had no hope of success; thus, logically, his only purpose was
to frustrate the court and waste government resources.

[163]   As
I stated in court on September 2, 2022, this Court was and is prepared to hear
Hardy’s legitimate arguments and applications. He has rights under the law and
the Constitution that the court is committed to protecting, including the
presumption of innocence in his substantive trial. He truly is the author of
his own misfortune.

Sentence
Imposed

[164]   Hardy
is of the view that this court has no jurisdiction over him. He is wrong. He
has been found guilty of criminal contempt of court. As I have repeatedly said,
the present case’s primary sentencing goals are denunciation and deterrence.
The sentence that is called for must get the attention of Hardy and other
like-minded OPCA-type adherents. It must get people to sit up and take notice.
It is in the interests of justice to do so.

[165]   As
set out recently by Justice Thompson in Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v.
Rainforest Flying Squad
,
2023 BCSC 563,

[17]      In
Canadian criminal law, the concept of the ‘interests of justice’ has come to be
understood as encompassing the interests of the accused, the interests of the
Crown, broad-based societal concerns and the integrity of the criminal
process”: R. v. Cowan,
2021 SCC 45 at para. 63. In R.
v. Abbey
,
2013 ONCA 206 at para. 29, Watt J.A. described the phrase
“interests of justice” as a “legal chameleon that takes its meaning from its
surroundings.” The phrase “signals the existence of a judicial discretion to be
exercised on a case-by-case basis”: R. v. Bernardo 
(1997), 1997 CanLII 2240 (ON CA), 121
C.C.C. (3d) 123 (Ont. C.A.)
at para. 16.

[166]   In
the circumstances, the court must bring home to Hardy and other like-minded
individuals the futility of denying the legitimacy and authority of Canada’s
courts and the consequence of disrupting and impeding the administration of
justice. No fine, a conditional sentence order, or a probationary term would be
appropriate, given Hardy’s refusal to accept the court’s jurisdiction or follow
its orders. Although I am not ordering costs against Hardy, as set out
in Fearn
v Canada Customs
, the prospect that in the future, costs will be considered
against OPCA-type offenders in criminal contempt of court cases should not be
dismissed.

[167]   The
sentence imposed is one year in jail.

_____________________________

The
Honourable Judge D. Patterson

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